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1293 
THE LEGAL MONOPOLY 
Renee Newman Knake* 
Abstract: Lawyers enjoy an exclusive monopoly over their craft, one unlike any other 
profession or industry. They bar all others from offering legal representation. In most 
jurisdictions, lawyer-judges draft, enact, and enforce their own professional conduct rules as 
well as preside over any legal challenge to the rules’ validity. Lawyer regulation purports to 
protect the public and preserve professionalism, but it also reduces competition, constrains 
information, and maintains artificially high prices. Consequently, much of the American public 
goes without help when a lawyer is needed. 
Federal antitrust law typically steps in to remedy this sort of pervasive market control, 
promoting competition and free markets for the public good. The legal profession, however, 
largely avoids antitrust scrutiny because the courts fall into a special exception known as the 
“state action doctrine,” permitting anticompetitive actions by governmental bodies to engage 
in what otherwise would be illegal, anticompetitive activity. But a key presumption justifying 
this exception—that the regulators are not themselves members of the regulated profession or 
industry—is not true for most lawyer regulation. Accordingly, this Article proposes applying 
federal antitrust law to scrutinize the legal monopoly, and suggests that doing so may increase 
access to affordable legal services while preserving professionalism and client protection. 
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INTRODUCTION 
As much as 80% of the American public goes without a lawyer to 
resolve legal problems, primarily due to lack of information and cost.1 
This problem, first acknowledged in the 1930s,2 continues nearly a 
century later, notwithstanding extensive efforts like expanded legal aid 
and pro bono services.3 To understand why, consider the market for legal 
services. 
High barriers to entry, information asymmetries, and anticompetitive 
restrictions are hallmarks of the legal profession. Only lawyers, regulated 
exclusively by lawyer-judges in most jurisdictions, may provide legal 
representation. The profession justifies this level of self-regulation as 
necessary to preserve independence and ensure that the judicial branch 
remains a separate check on the executive and legislative branches of 
government. At the same time, this regulation prices legal representation 
beyond what many individuals can afford, consequently making access to 
                                                     
1. See infra note 195. 
2. See Stephen Love, Karl Llewellyn, Osmond Fraenkel & Malcolm Sharp, Economic Security and 
the Young Lawyer: Four Views, 32 ILL. L. REV. 662, 663 (1938); Lloyd K. Garrison, et al., Report of 
the Special Committee on the Economic Condition of the Bar, 63 A.B.A. REP. 390, 391 (1938) 
(“[P]eople in the low income groups frequently go without legal assistance because they cannot afford 
to pay for it, or because they think they cannot afford to pay for it, or because they distrust lawyers or 
do not know any lawyers, or do not know when they need advice . . . .”). 
3. See generally REBECCA L. SANDEFUR, ACCESSING JUSTICE IN THE CONTEMPORARY USA: 
FINDINGS FROM THE COMMUNITY NEEDS AND SERVICES STUDY (2014) [hereinafter SANDEFUR, 
ACCESSING JUSTICE], http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2478040 
[https://perma.cc/P5LD-NU26]. 
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justice out of reach.4 It also limits available information so severely that 
much of the American public does not realize when a life problem has a 
legal solution.5 
Federal antitrust law typically breaks up business relationships like 
this, where members of an industry or profession act in concert to suppress 
competition. Why does the legal profession enjoy such control over the 
market for its services? The answer lies in the unique role that lawyer-
judges play simultaneously as a regulatory arm of the state and also as 
members of the regulated profession. 
When the state creates the monopoly or cartel, regulatory constraints 
typically are immune from antitrust review under what is known as the 
“state-action doctrine.”6 This exemption from antitrust liability is based 
upon principles of federalism, state sovereignty, and judicial economy.7 It 
is justified, at least in part, by the belief that publicly accountable officials 
will not be influenced by the same financial motivation or other self-
interest as private actors.8 Moreover, state regulatory officials usually 
represent a diverse range of backgrounds and experiences. This is not the 
case, however, for legal assistance. 
In most jurisdictions, the highest courts—made up of judges who 
usually are also lawyers—adopt and enforce rules governing who may 
practice law and how law may be practiced. Even where these lawyer-
judge regulators are presumed nonpartisan by virtue of a committee-based 
appointment process or subject to some measure of public accountability 
through elections, the fact remains that they are members of the profession 
subject to the regulations they enact and enforce. 
Consequently, lawyer-judge regulators are vulnerable to capture, both 
perceived and actual, because as industry members, they may consciously 
or unconsciously advance the commercial or special concerns of their own 
profession. Although the judiciary is presumed to act in the public’s 
interest, its members are nonetheless part of the legal profession. This 
vulnerability ought to remove lawyer regulation from aspects of the state 
                                                     
4. Id. 
5. Id. 
6. See infra notes 38–45 and accompanying text. 
7. See S. Paul Posner, The Proper Relationship Between State Regulation and the Federal Antitrust 
Laws, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 693, 703–05 (1973). 
8. See Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 45 (1985) (“We may presume, absent a 
showing to the contrary, that the municipality acts in the public interest. A private party, on the other 
hand, may be presumed to be acting primarily on his or its own behalf.”); Frank H. Easterbrook, 
Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J.L. & ECON. 23, 27 (1983) (“[R]egulation often is 
procured by and designed for the benefit of those the regulation purports to control.”). 
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action doctrine. Even if individual lawyers or judges may act to advance 
consumer interests over the profession’s interests, capture risks remain. 
When members of a profession enact and enforce anticompetitive 
regulations as an arm of the state—whether as legislators, the judiciary, 
or the executive—dual allegiances exist. As Justice Kennedy cautioned in 
the 2015 decision North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC,9 
such an arrangement risks that “established ethical standards” will “blend 
with private anticompetitive motives in a way difficult for even market 
participants to discern.”10 Accordingly, in this sort of circumstance, 
limiting antitrust immunity is “most essential.”11 
Interestingly, courts do not protect competition only via antitrust law. 
In several instances, the U.S. Supreme Court used the First Amendment 
to limit anticompetitive regulations when state action immunity would 
otherwise protect the regulation from federal antitrust review.12 Economic 
constraints long thought well outside the purview of free speech doctrine 
have increasingly been struck down on First Amendment grounds, 
beginning in the late 1970s with advertising by pharmacists, optometrists, 
lawyers, and beyond.13 Thus, the commercial speech doctrine became an 
alternative vehicle for striking down anticompetitive state regulation. 
The practice of treating competition as commercial speech, however, 
is imprecise, failing at times to fully account for the economic and 
informational consequences of anticompetitive regulations. Some 
scholars argue that this causes undesirable distortion in First Amendment 
jurisprudence and threatens to return the country to a Lochner-like era.14 
Moreover, the manipulation of free speech principles to reach 
anticompetitive state action does not fully account for the potential 
complications of capture on a pragmatic level where, as in the case of the 
legal profession, the public official administering (and reviewing the 
                                                     
9. 574 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015).  
10. Id. at 1111, 1116–17 (holding that the state dental board violated antitrust law by issuing cease-
and-desist letters to providers of teeth whitening services).  
11. Id. at 1111. 
12. See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) 
(holding that a blanket ban on advertising violated the First Amendment). 
13. See infra notes 96–101 and accompanying text. 
14. See, e.g., Robert Post & Amanda Shanor, Adam Smith’s First Amendment, 128 HARV. L. REV. 
F. 165, 165–66 (2015) (critiquing the D.C. Circuit’s recent decision striking a licensing requirement 
for tour guides on First Amendment grounds and observing that “[u]ntil very recently, it was well 
accepted that purely economic regulations are subject to rational basis review. This was the point of 
consigning Lochner v. New York to the anti-canon. Since the New Deal, black-letter constitutional 
law has authorized the Nation to regulate the complexities of modern economic life in ways designed 
to modify the unobstructed operation of the private market” (citations omitted)).  
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constitutionality of) the constraint is also a member of the very industry 
prospering from it. 
This Article is the first to identify these interrelated problems of 
substituting the First Amendment to address anticompetitive actions by a 
self-regulated state entity, and to propose expanded federal antitrust 
review as a solution. This proposal engages important debates within three 
areas of legal scholarship—federal antitrust law, First Amendment 
jurisprudence, and legal ethics. These debates frame the Article’s 
organization. 
Part I of this Article describes the origin of the legal monopoly, 
explaining how lawyer-judges regulate legal ethics and the practice of 
law. Part I also explores the unique concerns presented when the state 
official responsible for suppressing competition is a member of the 
regulated group, looking in particular at the exceptional situation of courts 
as regulators of the legal profession, though this analysis potentially bears 
on other professions and industries as well. Here, this Article addresses an 
oversight in the commentary on federal antitrust law and state regulation 
of the professions and applies capture theory to critique the conflicts of 
interest at play when the sovereign regulator is a member of the targeted 
group. Part I also examines the evolution of the First Amendment’s 
commercial speech doctrine as a tool to address competition constraints 
at the state level that would otherwise be unreachable under the state 
action doctrine. This Article cautions against reliance upon free speech 
doctrine rather than federal antitrust law for striking down anticompetitive 
regulations. Such reliance distorts First Amendment jurisprudence and 
arbitrarily permits review of some, but not all, anticompetitive state 
action. 
Part II offers an overview of the interaction between federal antitrust 
law and state anticompetitive regulation. Here, this Article discusses 
relevant decisions since the U.S. Supreme Court first articulated the state 
action doctrine over seventy years ago in Parker v. Brown.15 This 
discussion includes the Court’s most recent guidance from North 
Carolina Board of Dental Examiners, where the Court held that a state 
agency comprised almost entirely of members of a profession—dentists—
could not prohibit outsiders from offering teeth-whitening services, 
though the dentists argued this constituted the unlawful practice of 
dentistry. In the months following the Court’s decision, at least three 
different antitrust challenges were filed in federal district courts by legal 
                                                     
15. 371 U.S. 341 (1943). 
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services providers against state bar authorities, an indication that the 
questions posed and addressed by this Article are likely to recur.16 
Part III proposes limiting antitrust immunity for challenges against 
anticompetitive lawyer-judge-made regulations. Here, this Article reflects 
upon the goals of federal competition law in the context of the public’s 
interest in legal services. This Article proposes that anticompetitive 
regulations only should be protected by the “state action doctrine” when 
the regulation either (1) cures a market problem to the public’s benefit or 
(2) preserves an essential element of professional practice. Striking 
anticompetitive professional conduct rules that do not fall into one of 
these categories promises to expand access to legal services for large 
segments of the American public. 
I. THE LEGAL MONOPOLY 
The legal profession is unique in its degree of self-regulation. Lawyer-
judge regulators craft and enforce the rules for their own profession 
without the elements of public accountability and due process ascribed to 
government actors, most notably public elections of disinterested external 
individuals and independent judicial review. Capture theory provides 
justification for reconsidering how the state action doctrine should be 
applied (or, at least, how competition values should be weighed) in the 
context of self-regulation. 
A. How Lawyer-Judges Regulate Legal Ethics and the Practice of 
Law 
Consider the implications of the lawyer-driven regulatory regime. Most 
states draw from model ethics rules and policies promulgated by lawyers 
elected by their peers to the American Bar Association (“ABA”) House 
of Delegates. These lawyers likely have direct financial interest in the 
rules that they draft. The drafting and enactment of the model rules and 
policies are not subject to external review. The highest court in each state 
then bases its body of regulations upon the ABA’s model rules and 
policies.17 This process typically occurs behind closed doors, without 
                                                     
16. See infra note 183. 
17. It should be noted that in a few states, some regulation of lawyers occurs via the legislature—
this would more clearly fall under the umbrella of state action protection and, assuming the legislature 
is not made up entirely of lawyers, is not the subject of my focus here. For example, the states of 
Alaska, California, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Virginia, and Wyoming all have 
legal authority promulgated by a combination of judicial and legislative powers. NAT’L CONF. OF 
BAR EXAM’RS & AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, 
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public hearings or open meetings, at most with a period for public notice 
and comment.18 While one might argue that in states where the members 
of the highest courts are elected19 some public accountability is in place, 
the fact remains that at all levels of regulation, from drafting to enactment 
to enforcement to adjudication, lawyers (or lawyer-judges) hold exclusive 
control.20 
Despite all of these concerns, federal courts and the Federal Trade 
Commission (“FTC”) apply the state action doctrine to the state supreme 
courts when acting legislatively because, “[a]s a coordinate branch of the 
sovereign exercising a constitutionally prescribed legislative authority, 
the state supreme court is entitled to deference in its regulatory choices.”21 
This deference is grounded in the courts’ “traditions of independence and 
principled decision-making that distinguish them from regulatory 
                                                     
COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO BAR ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS 1 (2014); see also CHARLES W. 
WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 2.6.1, at 51 (1986) (“Modern lawyer codes plainly are adopted 
by courts and legislatures for the purpose of authoritatively measuring a lawyer’s liability to 
professional discipline.”). 
18. Regarding the closed process for lawyer regulation, see Paul R. Verkuil, State Action, Due 
Process and Antitrust: Reflections on Parker v. Brown, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 328, 351–54 (1975) 
(describing the example of Virginia law, where the Virginia Supreme Court is empowered “to control 
and regulate the practice of law” including the authority to “promulgate a code of ethics to govern 
attorney conduct” and observing that this sort of “regulation provides no public hearing on minimum 
fee schedules and no maximum rate setting”). Regarding the attorney discipline process, see Leslie 
C. Levin, The Case for Less Secrecy in Lawyer Discipline, 20 GEO J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 19–20 (2007) 
(“The extent to which the disciplinary process is private varies from state to state. Only Florida, New 
Hampshire, Oregon, and West Virginia treat all or most complaints about lawyers as a matter of public 
record. In most other states, the complaint becomes a public record once there has been a finding of 
probable cause. In a minority of the jurisdictions, the public cannot attend disciplinary hearings even 
after probable cause is found; information about complaints does not become publicly available until 
there has been a finding of wrongdoing and a public sanction is imposed.” (internal citations omitted)). 
19. Thirty-eight states hold judicial elections at the supreme court level, where the remaining states 
utilize a system of appointment usually by an advisory committee. See Joe Palazzolo, Judges Step up 
Electioneering as Outside Money Pours in to Races, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 13, 2014), 
http://online.wsj.com/articles/judges-step-up-electioneering-as-outside-money-pours-into-races-
1413149643 [https://perma.cc/477X-W7L5].  
20. At its extreme, when a rule is challenged, plaintiffs are forced to argue their case before the 
very officials who enacted the rule. See, e.g., Grievance Adm’r v. Fieger, 719 N.W.2d 123 (Mich. 
2006) (lawyer challenging constitutionality of professional conduct rules promulgated by the 
Michigan Supreme Court). While beyond the scope of this Article, it is for this reason challengers to 
lawyer conduct rules should have the ability to bring their case in federal court where, at least, they 
will not be forced to argue the validity of rules before the judges who adopt and enforce them. See 
WOLFRAM, supra note 17, § 2.2.1, at 23 (“One uncomfortable consequence is that the same body that 
promulgates comprehensive sets of rules regulating the conduct of lawyers must also sit as the body 
that determines their validity if later attacked.” (citation omitted)). 
21. William H. Page, Interest Groups, Antitrust, and State Regulation: Parker v. Brown in the 
Economic Theory of Legislation, 1987 DUKE L.J. 618, 637 n.113.  
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agencies.”22 Although independence and principled decision-making are 
values “largely limited to the decisions of concrete cases, they are closely 
related to the court’s authority over the practice of law,”23 so the argument 
goes. 
Some scholars maintain that courts should “presum[e] . . . as ‘private’ 
any organization [even a government body] in which a decisive coalition 
(usually a majority) is made up of participants in the regulated market,”24 
but this is not how the judiciary or other lawyer-regulators have been 
treated in antitrust jurisprudence, perhaps because, in essence, judges are 
being asked to apply the antitrust law to themselves. Instead, state 
supreme courts, comprised of lawyer-judges who apply antitrust law to 
regulations adopted and enforced by members of their own profession, are 
treated as a sovereign.25 Indeed, courts jump entirely over this threshold 
inquiry, skipping ahead to decide whether the challenged regulatory 
action is that of the state without examining the composition of the state 
actor. Moreover, when lawyer-judges delegate regulatory power to a bar 
authority or licensing committee, courts still view the regulator as a 
governmental unit even when it is made up of a majority of market 
participants.26 
Consequently, lawyer regulation enjoys insulation from competition 
that, in some instances, may not only compromise consumer interests, but 
also may undermine constitutionally protected rights. Numerous 
regulations on the practice of law have suppressed competition. For 
example: 
Minimum fee schedules have kept fees high, unauthorized 
practice rules and bar admission standards have limited entry, 
                                                     
22. Id. 
23. Id.  
24. 1A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 227, at 226 (4th ed. 
2013); see also Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 191–92 (2010) (courts “seek 
the central substance of the situation and therefore . . . ‘are moved by the identity of the persons who 
act, rather than the label of their hats.’” (citing United States v. Sealy Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 353 (1967))). 
“The determination that a[n actor’s] activities constitute state action is not a purely formalistic 
inquiry.” Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 39 (1985). 
25. Applying the Parker doctrine articulated in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977), 
the Court observed “a state supreme court, when acting in a legislative capacity, occupies the same 
position as that of a state legislature. Therefore, a decision of a state supreme court, acting legislatively 
rather than judicially is exempt from Sherman Act liability as state action.” Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 
U.S. 558, 568 (1984) (citations omitted). 
26. Id. (observing that “[c]loser analysis is required when the activity at issue is not directly that of 
the legislature or supreme court, but is carried out by others pursuant to state authorization,” yet still 
finding that a bar regulation banning advertising was protected from antitrust challenge under the 
state action doctrine). 
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restrictions on advertising and solicitation have reduced 
competition and the development of new markets for legal 
services, and limitations on nonlawyer ownership of law firms has 
reduced capital flow into legal services markets.27 
Bar regulators justify any “resulting losses in economic 
efficiency . . . on the ground that the restrictive rules prevent more 
harmful effects on clients and society.”28 Yet, it is unclear whether these 
harmful effects even exist29 and, in any event, “[e]conomists . . . tend to 
believe that market efficiency is a net benefit to clients and society and 
probably to lawyers as a group.”30 
In drafting, adopting, and enforcing the rules applicable to their own 
profession, as well as reviewing their validity when subject to a legal 
challenge, it is not an overstatement to suggest that members of the 
judiciary may suffer from regulatory capture. The public-private 
distinction commonly used by the courts to define the contours of the state 
action exemption does not fully encompass the range of concerns 
presented by anticompetitive regulation in the context of a sovereign 
regulating an occupation of which it is also a member, as in the legal 
profession.31 This binary public-private dichotomy fails to account for the 
range of influences at play, including financial or other self-interest, rent-
seeking, conflicts, accountability to and pressure from members of one’s 
own group, and ethical blind spots such as cognitive bias or groupthink.32 
While it may be uncomfortable to contemplate that a particular judge 
would regulate or review lawyer regulation in a self-interested or self-
dealing way, this may occur without the judge being fully conscious of 
it.33 Lawyer-judge self-regulation is also susceptible to conflicts of 
interest and pressure from the local professional community. 
                                                     
27. WOLFRAM, supra note 17, § 2.4.1, at 39.  
28. Id. 
29. See Deborah L. Rhode & Lucy Buford Ricca, Protecting the Profession or the Public? 
Rethinking Unauthorized-Practice Enforcement, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2587, 2605–06 (2014).  
30. WOLFRAM, supra note 17, § 2.4, at 39; see also Gillian K. Hadfield, Legal Barriers to 
Innovation: The Growing Economic Cost of Professional Control over Corporate Legal Markets, 60 
STAN. L. REV. 1689 (2008) [hereinafter Hadfield, Legal Barriers to Innovation]; Deborah L. Rhode, 
Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized 
Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3–5 (1981). 
31. See generally Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964) (discussing the 
breakdown between public/private rights). 
32. See generally MAX H. BAZERMAN & ANN E. TENBRUNSEL, BLIND SPOTS: WHY WE FAIL TO 
DO WHAT’S RIGHT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2011). 
33. See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law 
and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1504 (1998) (discussing “suggestive evidence that self-
serving bias does affect lawyers and judges”); Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 587–88 (1984) 
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How might we better refine state action immunity to deal with these 
concerns? While some flexibility34 could be helpful to courts evaluating 
the application of federal antitrust law to the legal profession, modern 
doctrine does not adequately accommodate for this. The theory of 
regulatory capture offers a response. 
B. Antitrust and Regulatory Capture 
Capture theory would suggest that when the state’s economic choices 
are proscribed by a regulatory body that has overtaken the state’s political 
system, this process (and perhaps also the choices made within the 
process) is both inefficient and illegitimate.35 Occupational regulation has 
been long critiqued as an unjustified economic constraint, going back as 
far as Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations in the late 1700s.36 Economic 
literature over the ages has built upon Smith’s assessment, including the 
theory of regulatory capture, which suggests that occupations or other 
economic alliances endeavor to enrich themselves through the state’s 
power to control competition and price.37 
Professor John Shepard Wiley set forth his “capture theory of antitrust 
federalism” in a mid-1980s Harvard Law Review article to explain what 
he described as the U.S. Supreme Court’s “unpredictable but 
unmistakable willingness to subject state regulatory policies to 
supervening federal antitrust policy” in the wake of Parker v. Brown.38 In 
Parker, the U.S. Supreme Court set forth a special exemption from federal 
antitrust law for the states when they enact anticompetitive regulations.39 
                                                     
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (observing that while it may “seem[ ] highly improbable that members of the 
profession entrusted by the State Supreme Court with a public obligation to administer an examination 
system that will measure applicants’ competence would betray that trust, and secretly subvert that 
system to serve their private ends[;] [n]evertheless, the probability that respondent will not prevail at 
trial is no justification for dismissing the complaint”). 
34. See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 699 (1978) (Blackmun, J., 
concurring) (“In my view the decision in Goldfarb . . . properly left to the Court some flexibility in 
considering how to apply traditional Sherman Act concepts to professions long consigned to self-
regulation.” (citations omitted)). 
35. See generally George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. 
SCI. 3 (1971). 
36. For example, Adam Smith argued that the only purpose of mandated apprenticeships in the late 
1700s was to suppress competition, with self-regulated professions acting in “conspiracy against the 
public” and endeavoring to maintain artificially high prices. 1 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE 
NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS ch. X, pt. II (George Bell & Sons 1908) (1976). 
37. See generally Stigler, supra note 35. 
38. John Shepard Wiley Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L. REV. 713, 714 
(1986) [hereinafter Wiley, Capture Theory]. 
39. Id. 
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According to Wiley, this “doctrinal shift has paralleled a theoretical shift 
in our conceptions of the nature of regulation itself,” due at least in part to 
“a New Deal confidence in market regulation” that “Parker reflected.”40 
In the decades following Parker, “however, regulation came to be 
regarded as economically inefficient and as the product not of broad 
political consensus but of the capture of lawmaking bodies by producer 
groups seeking benefit at the expense of others.”41 “This changed attitude 
toward regulation” was reflected in a series of decisions by “courts to use 
the very state action doctrine that arose from a desire to defer to state 
sovereignty as a means to intrude increasingly on that sovereignty.”42 
Recognizing the fear of regulatory capture underlying the Court’s 
decisions led Wiley to formulate his preferred test for assessing the 
competitive effects of state regulation. His theory is grounded in two 
goals: first, “distributive justice for consumers”; and second, “economic 
efficiency.”43 He contends that one goal of federal antitrust preemption is 
to “assure justice for consumers” because “the Sherman Act entitles 
consumers to distributive justice: ultimate or household consumers 
deserve the surplus they gain from transacting in competitive markets. 
When producers appropriate consumer surplus by replacing competition 
with cooperation, the Act outlaws their effort.”44 
Wiley’s conceptualization of distributive justice for consumers is 
relevant to this Article’s project. His assessment of whether 
anticompetitive state action should endure contemplates a two-step 
inquiry: first, where “a state policy restrains market rivalry,” one must ask 
“if the policy is primarily a producer initiative”; and second, if so, the 
policy is void if it “hurts consumers by impairing competition without 
solving some serious market problem in a way beneficial to them.”45 In 
the end, he would “preempt anticompetitive state policies that producers 
have captured to the detriment of consumers.”46 
                                                     
40. Id. 
41. Id. at 715.  
42. Id. 
43. John Shepard Wiley Jr., A Capture Theory of Antirust Federalism: Reply to Professors Page 
and Spitzer, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1327, 1335 (1988) [hereinafter Wiley, Capture Theory: Reply to 
Professors Page and Spitzer]; see also Louis Kaplow & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust, in 2 HANDBOOK OF 
LAW AND ECONOMICS 1073 (2007) (“Yet the role of economics in shaping antitrust law has evolved 
greatly, especially over the past few decades. The growing influence of economics on antitrust law 
can be traced in part to the Chicago School, which, starting in the 1950s, launched a powerful attack 
on many antitrust rules and case outcomes that seemed to lack solid economic underpinnings.”). 
44. Wiley, Capture Theory: Reply to Professors Page and Spitzer, supra note 43, at 1335–36. 
45. Id. at 1336. 
46. Id. at 1341. 
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Scholars have critiqued capture theory on a number of grounds, though 
none hold particular weight here in the context of self-regulation. Some 
scholars argue that “[b]ecause regulatory politics are extremely complex, 
frequently combining winning coalitions from many different groups, it 
is difficult to know when, if ever, the regulatory process has been 
captured.”47 In other words, it is difficult to find “direct proof” of 
regulatory capture because “legislative histories, such as committee 
reports and floor debates, are rarely maintained. Still less common are 
records of municipal and administrative deliberation.”48 While this 
complexity of coalitions may be true for most regulation moving through 
a legislative or administrative rule-making process, this description does 
not accurately characterize the process for regulating lawyers—no proof 
is needed to demonstrate that lawyer regulation, in most jurisdictions, is 
handled almost exclusively by lawyers. 
Another critique questions whether “regulation generated by producer 
capture is less legitimate than other anticompetitive, inefficient 
regulation.”49 Reliance upon capture theory is at times discredited as also 
threatening economic efficiency and the political process. In reviewing 
antitrust challenges, courts face “a difficult dilemma: how to respect the 
political process in the states without frustrating Congress’ purpose in 
enacting the Sherman Act.”50 To achieve this balance, courts “focus on 
preventing the delegation to private parties of the power to restrain 
competition” and “[a]s long as a state retained effective control over the 
regulation of its economy, the federal judiciary would honor that state’s 
political decision to restrain market forces.”51 Thus, according to critics, 
applying capture theory “as the touchstone for preempting state law” 
would “overturn[] those results. And that is a role the courts should not 
permit antitrust laws to play.”52 
This Article conceives of “capture” more narrowly, and as such is not 
vulnerable in the same way to these criticisms. For example, among self-
regulated professions, no special effort such as lobbying or other external 
                                                     
47. Matthew L. Spitzer, Antitrust Federalism and Rational Choice Political Economy: A Critique 
of Capture Theory, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1305 (1988). 
48. Page, supra note 21, at 647; id. at 625 (arguing that “judicial intervention is justified when 
regulation that conflicts with antitrust exploits an independent defect in the process of representation. 
The function of intervention, then, is to resubmit the issue to the state political process for fuller 
consideration”). 
49. Spitzer, supra note 47, at 1302–03. 
50. Merrick B. Garland, Antitrust and State Action: Economic Efficiency and the Political Process, 
96 YALE L.J. 486, 518 (1987). 
51. Id. at 518–19. 
52. Id. at 519.  
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pressure is necessary to capture the state regulator ex ante, an effect 
labeled by some as “pre-capture.”53 Likewise, no effort is needed to 
determine whether the industry influences its regulatory body; the body is 
the industry. 
Lawyer regulation by its very design operates from a baseline of 
capture. The result, inevitably, is a risk that regulation will maximize 
economic rents for the profession at the public’s and/or consumer’s 
expense. This rent-seeking is evident in an array of professional conduct 
rules governing who may practice law (e.g., licensing requirements and 
geographic restrictions)54 and how law may be practiced (e.g., bans on 
multi-disciplinary practices and outside ownership and investment in law 
firms, and limitations on advertising, solicitation, and referrals).55 
Nevertheless, might there be good reasons for allowing this inherently 
captured regulatory structure to persevere? 
C. Capture of Lawyer-Judge Regulators 
The capture of lawyer-judge regulators plays out in unique ways in the 
context of the legal profession. On the one hand, lawyers play a special 
role in democratic government which, arguably, demands insulation from 
regulation by other political branches. On the other hand, the self-
regulation necessary for preserving independence can also be vulnerable 
to dual allegiances. 
1. The Special Role of Lawyers in a Democracy 
Without question, lawyers hold a unique place in society, which may 
necessitate some protection for the profession from competitive market 
pressures. As scholars observe: “The role of an attorney in navigating and, 
when necessary, challenging the law is a critical component of American 
                                                     
53. Oliver E. Williamson, Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization, 36 J.L. & ECON. 
453, 486 n.137 (1993) (citing Stigler, supra note 35). 
54. The legal profession’s conduct is, in effect, cartel-like “in restricting entry and negotiating 
agreements with competing groups.” Rhode, supra note 30, at 4 n.7; see also Walter Gellhorn, The 
Abuse of Occupational Licensing, 44 U. CHI L. REV. 6, 11 (1976) (“Licensing, imposed ostensibly to 
protect the public, almost always impedes only those who desire to enter the occupation or 
‘profession;’ those already in practice remain entrenched without a demonstration of fitness or 
probity.”). 
55. See, e.g., Geoffrey Hazard, Russell Pearce & Jeffrey Stempel, Why Lawyers Should Be Allowed 
to Advertise: A Market Analysis of Legal Services, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1084, 1093 (1983); Rhode, 
supra note 30, at 1; Deborah L. Rhode, The Unauthorized Practice of Law and Pro Se Divorce: An 
Empirical Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 104 (1976). 
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democratic government.”56 For example, litigating in the courts “may well 
be the sole practicable avenue open to a minority to petition for redress of 
grievances”57 and lawyers are critical to this process. Lawyers protect 
individuals from the excesses of the sovereign58 and “play an 
indispensable part in . . . nonviolent means of dispute resolution.”59 
Lawyers embody the law. As one scholar explains, they act as: 
[A]gents who communicate the rules through advice to private 
clients and governments and enable them to organize their 
businesses and structure their transactions and comply with 
regulations and tax laws and constitutional limitations; and who 
can negotiate and if necessary litigate with the state and other 
private parties when their claims of rights are impaired or 
disputed.60 
It is commonly accepted that “[o]ur legal system is premised on the 
assumption that law is intended to be known or knowable, that law is in 
its nature public information.”61 This means that “[t]he ‘rule of law’ as we 
understand it requires promulgation. . . . And one fundamental, well-
                                                     
56. Renee Newman Knake, Attorney Advice and the First Amendment, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
639, 642–43 (2011) (citing David Luban, Legal Ideals and Moral Obligations: A Comment on Simon, 
38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 255, 259 (1996) (“[B]ecause lawyers are often better positioned than 
nonlawyers to realize the unfairness or unreasonableness of a law, lawyers often should be among the 
first . . . to counsel others that it is acceptable to violate or nullify it.”)); Geoffrey R. Stone, A Lawyer’s 
Responsibility: Protecting Civil Liberties in Wartime, 22 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 47 (2006) (“It is the 
legal profession that is most fundamentally responsible for helping the nation strike the right balance 
[between national security and civil liberties] and for defending our freedoms.”). 
57. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429–30 (1963) (citations omitted); see also United Mine 
Workers of Am., Dist. 12 v. Ill. State Bar Ass’n, 389 U.S. 217, 223 (1967) (reinforcing that the First 
Amendment protections established in Button extend beyond “political matters of acute social 
moment” and that “[g]reat secular causes, with small ones, are guarded” (citations and punctuation 
omitted)); Daniel Markovits, A MODERN LEGAL ETHICS: ADVERSARY ADVOCACY IN A DEMOCRATIC 
AGE 171–211 (2008); id. at 185 (“One might say, then, that what democracy is to political legitimacy 
at wholesale, adjudication is to political legitimacy at retail.”). 
58. See, e.g., ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 348 (6th ed. 1876) (observing 
that lawyers are “the most powerful existing security against the excesses of democracy” given “the 
authority . . . intrusted [sic] to members of the legal profession, and the influence which these 
individuals exercise in the government”). 
59. MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS 19 (3d ed. 2004).  
60. Robert W. Gordon, The Role of Lawyers in Producing the Rule of Law: Some Critical 
Reflections, 11 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 441, 448 (2010) (“Legal regulations and procedures are 
complicated and rapidly changing; so that sophisticated, experienced agents who know their way 
around the rule-systems and the courts are generally essential to effective representation within and 
operation of the system.”). 
61. Stephen L. Pepper, Counseling at the Limits of the Law: An Exercise in the Jurisprudence and 
Ethics of Lawyering, 104 YALE L.J. 1545, 1547 (1995). 
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understood aspect of the lawyer’s role is to be the conduit for that 
promulgation.”62 
In short, lawyers effectively are the law: “In a complex legal 
environment much law cannot be known and acted upon, cannot function 
as law, without lawyers to make it accessible to those for whom it is 
relevant.”63 Given the special nature of the work that lawyers do as it 
relates to the functioning of the legal system and the foundations of 
American government, it is not surprising that the state might find it more 
efficient to allow the profession to determine its own regulatory standards 
rather than look to external sources. Moreover, external regulation64 could 
fundamentally compromise the very role that lawyers are meant to fulfill 
in the system of democratic checks and balances.65 For these reasons, 
some argue that the best balance to be struck is one in which lawyers self-
regulate given the intractable relationship with lawyers to law and the 
necessity that lawyers not be controlled by other branches of the 
government, even in the face of regulatory capture.66 
2. Self-Regulation and Dual Allegiances 
Even so, when members of a profession self-regulate, “those who have 
the most to gain from reduced consumer welfare in the form of higher 
prices are tasked with protecting consumer welfare in the form of health 
                                                     
62. Id.  
63. Id. at 1548. For a competing view on the value of a lawyer’s role in selecting information for a 
client, see Louis Kaplow & Stephen Shavell, Legal Advice About Information to Present in Litigation: 
Its Effects and Social Desirability, 102 HARV. L. REV. 565, 613–14 (1989) (“Our conclusions cast 
doubt on the social value of lawyers’ role in selecting information for their clients, thereby challenging 
one of the fundamental premises of the legal system.”). 
64. External regulation would include state or federal legislative regulations or other control by 
authority from outside the legal profession. For further discussion of the distinction between internal 
and external regulation of lawyers, see Ted Schneyer, An Interpretation of Recent Developments in 
the Regulation of Law Practice, 30 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 559 (2005). 
65. See, e.g., James M. Fischer, External Control over the American Bar, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
59, 97 (2006) (the consequence of legislative control “over lawyer practice may come to erode the 
ability of lawyers to serve as a bulwark against the aggrandizement of government power vis à vis the 
individual”). 
66. See Page, supra note 21, at 637 n.113 (“Despite this danger[ ] [of regulatory capture][,] the 
extension of the state action exemption to policies of the state supreme court is necessary. As a 
coordinate branch of the sovereign exercising a constitutionally prescribed legislative authority, the 
state supreme court is entitled to deference in its regulatory choices. Courts have traditions of 
independence and principled decisionmaking that distinguish them from regulatory agencies. While 
those traditions are largely limited to the decisions of concrete cases, they are closely related to the 
court’s authority over the practice of law.”). 
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and safety—the fox guards the henhouse.”67 Thus, as other commentators 
have observed, we are left to rely upon “an unsupervised group of 
competitors appointed to regulate their own profession . . . to neglect their 
selfish interests in favor of the state’s.”68 For the judiciary, this is 
problematic on multiple levels in that the judiciary not only regulates itself 
but also members of the legal profession, of which it also is a part.69 
Competition is not the only value at stake; self-regulation by the 
judiciary also undermines judicial independence.70 Beyond regulating 
themselves, “[t]he multiple institutional, political, and personal 
connections between the judiciary and the lawyers they are ostensibly 
regulating, as well as the natural inaccessibility of judges to the public, 
virtually guarantees lawyers a stranglehold over every aspect of lawyer 
regulation.”71 As such, “[i]n this context, the bar is not only working in its 
occupational interests, but is also leveraging its close and unique 
relationship with its regulators, state judiciaries.”72 
D. Antitrust and the Legal Profession: Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar 
For the most part, courts have treated lawyer regulation as protected 
state action, without inquiring too deeply into concerns of capture or other 
conflicts inherent in this sort of regulatory structure. This is not to say that 
                                                     
67. Aaron Edlin & Rebecca Haw, Cartels by Another Name: Should Licensed Occupations Face 
Antitrust Scrutiny?, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1093, 1140 (2014). 
68. Id. at 1143. 
69. See, e.g., Page, supra note 21, at 637 n.113 (“It is naive to think that state supreme courts, even 
those whose members are appointed, are fully insulated from interest-group pressures. Indeed, the 
kinds of considerations developed in section III of this article, suggest that there is a danger that state 
courts will enact rules in the interest of the legal profession against the broader consumer interest. 
The court is composed of lawyers; it is small in number; and it is in daily contact with the regulated 
group.”). 
70. See Dana Ann Remus, Just Conduct: Regulating Bench-Bar Relationships, 30 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 123, 147–48 (2011) (observing that judicial codes undermine judicial independence 
because they “allow behaviors that may create opportunities and appearances of judicial bias and 
partiality” and they “allow the interpretation of ambiguous provisions to be conditioned by bar norms, 
which include private interests and private orientations, rather than by independent judicial norms, 
which ideally are oriented exclusively toward state and public interests”). 
71. Benjamin H. Barton, An Institutional Analysis of Lawyer Regulation: Who Should Control 
Lawyer Regulation—Courts, Legislatures, or the Market?, 37 GA. L. REV. 1167, 1239 (2003) 
(arguing that “[l]egislatures, while typically criticized for their accessibility to organized special 
interests, would fare better with lawyer regulation than judiciaries” for avoiding the conflicts of 
interest and other concerns associated with regulatory capture). 
72. Remus, supra note 70, at 147 (arguing that “[b]ar influence over attorney conduct regulation” 
not only “raises the specter of regulatory capture” but also presents “an even more worrisome 
concern—that the bar will not only capture but more explicitly control and co-opt power from its 
regulator, which is itself a branch of government”). 
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courts blindly endorse all anticompetitive lawyer regulation; for example, 
the U.S. Supreme Court has struck down a minimum fee schedule as well 
as a rule banning all lawyer advertising.73 In striking these constraints on 
competition, the Court’s primary focus was the public’s access to legal 
services. Interestingly, however, the Court reached this conclusion by 
applying different bodies of law. While antitrust law was used to 
scrutinize the fee schedule, the Court turned to the First Amendment for 
acting on the advertising ban. This turn to constitutional law is not without 
consequence, as explained below, but first some history about the 
application of antitrust law to the professions is necessary. 
For nearly a century, all professions were considered exempt from 
federal antitrust law. The U.S. Supreme Court addressed the Sherman 
Act’s application to the legal profession for the first time in Goldfarb v. 
Virginia State Bar74 where it not only brought the professions under 
antitrust review but also found the fee schedule at issue in violation of 
federal law.75 While not explicit on the face of the opinion, Wiley’s 
capture theory helps explain and justify the Court’s decision.76 
The Fairfax County Bar Association (“FCBA”) argued in Goldfarb that 
federal antitrust law was “never intended to include the learned 
professions.”77 The Bar took the position that “competition is inconsistent 
with the practice of a profession because enhancing profit is not the goal 
of professional activities; the goal is to provide services necessary to the 
community.”78 The Court declined to extend a blanket Sherman Act 
exemption for the legal profession,79 instead examining the specific 
anticompetitive behavior at issue and applying Parker’s state action 
doctrine.80 
                                                     
73. See Easterbrook, supra note 8, at 27 (“The ‘ethical’ requirement that lawyers charge minimum 
fees, at issue in Goldfarb, was seen as a simple cartel; . . . the ban on attorneys’ advertising in Bates 
appeared as a way to jack up prices by denying clients information about the identity of low-priced 
attorneys. Justices convinced that state regulation was in the interest of the firms at the expense of 
consumers were reluctant to give antitrust blessings to the results.”); Janet F. Bently et al., Bar 
Association Minimum Fee Schedules and the Antitrust Laws, 1974 DUKE L.J. 1164 (1974). 
74. 421 U.S. 773 (1975). 
75. Id. at 791–92.  
76. See Wiley, Capture Theory, supra note 38, at 727 (“The Goldfarb Court echoed the capture 
notion that regulation serves industry ends, for instance, when it referred to the attorney minimum fee 
schedule at issue as ‘essentially a private anticompetitive activity’—even though state law enforced 
the schedule.” (citation omitted)). 
77. Goldfarb, 412 U.S. at 786. 
78. Id. (citation omitted). 
79. Id. at 787. 
80. Id. at 788. 
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Goldfarb involved a challenge by a husband and wife purchasing a 
home.81 They could not find an attorney to assist with their title 
examination who would accept a fee lower than the minimum fee 
schedule published by the FCBA.82 They contacted thirty-six attorneys; 
nineteen replied but refused to offer their services.83 The schedule was not 
enforced by the FCBA, but the Virginia State Bar, an administrative 
agency of the Virginia Supreme Court, had officially condoned fee 
schedules and opined that they could not be ignored.84 Indeed, one opinion 
went so far as to provide “that ‘evidence that an attorney habitually 
charges less than the suggested minimum fee schedule adopted by his 
local bar Association raises a presumption that such lawyer is guilty of 
misconduct.’”85 Yet, according to the lower court, “although the fee 
schedule and enforcement mechanism substantially restrained 
competition among lawyers, publication of the schedule by the County 
Bar was outside the scope” of federal review.86 
The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed and, Justice Burger, writing for a 
unanimous Court, observed: “The nature of an occupation, standing alone, 
does not provide sanctuary from the Sherman Act, nor is the public-
service aspect of professional practice controlling in determining whether 
[the Act] includes professions.”87 Moreover, he explained: “In the modern 
world it cannot be denied that the activities of lawyers play an important 
part in commercial intercourse, and that anticompetitive activities by 
lawyers may exert a restraint on commerce.”88 As such, the Court had no 
trouble finding that attorneys are not, simply by virtue of being a learned 
profession, removed from the Sherman Act’s reach.89 Consequently, the 
Virginia State Bar along with the FCBA found themselves liable for a 
                                                     
81. Id. at 775.  
82. Id. at 776. 
83. Id.  
84. Id. at 776–77. 
85. Id. at 777–78.  
86. Id. at 775. 
87. Id. at 787 (citations omitted). 
88. Id. at 788. 
89. Id. at 790 (“The threshold inquiry in determining if an anticompetitive activity is state action 
of the type the Sherman Act was not meant to proscribe is whether the activity is required by the State 
acting as sovereign. . . . Here we need not inquire further into the state-action question because it 
cannot fairly be said that the State of Virginia [sic] through its Supreme Court Rules required the 
anticompetitive activities of either respondent.”); id. at 791 (“It is not enough that . . . anticompetitive 
conduct is ‘prompted’ by state action; rather, anticompetitive activities must be compelled by 
direction of the State acting as a sovereign.”). 
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$200,000 settlement, reached after the case was remanded to the district 
court and paid from an assessment levied upon the bar members.90 
At the same time, however, the Court acknowledged that professional 
regulatory bodies might warrant special treatment under federal antitrust 
law: 
The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as 
distinguished from a business is, of course, relevant in 
determining whether that particular restraint violates the Sherman 
Act. It would be unrealistic to view the practice of professions as 
interchangeable with other business activities, and automatically 
to apply to the professions antitrust concepts which originated in 
other areas. The public service aspect, and other features of the 
professions, may require that a particular practice, which could 
properly be viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in another 
context, be treated differently.91 
Strikingly, the opinion contains no mention that the justices themselves 
and the judges reviewing the matter in the courts below, as well as the 
regulators setting the challenged price schedule and issuing legal opinions 
about it, were all members of the regulated profession. The only 
distinction between lawyers and other professions mentioned by the Court 
went to lawyer exceptionalism, offering additional support for upholding 
future economic constraints:  
The interest of the States in regulating lawyers is especially great 
since lawyers are essential to the primary governmental function 
of administering justice, and have historically been ‘officers of 
the courts.’ In holding that certain anticompetitive conduct by 
lawyers is within the reach of the Sherman Act we intend no 
diminution of the authority of the State to regulate its 
professions.92 
Goldfarb opened the door to federal antitrust review for state regulation 
of the professions, but in later cases the U.S. Supreme Court declined to 
extend the reasoning for limiting antitrust immunity to challenges against 
the state supreme court itself rather than an entity like the Virginia State 
Bar. Significantly—and the significance of this point cannot be 
overstated—the Court continued to review anticompetitive professional 
regulations even when mandated directly by the state supreme court. But 
rather than applying federal antitrust law, the Court turned to the First 
Amendment. However, in doing so, the Court made a fateful choice, 
                                                     
90. WOLFRAM, supra note 17, § 2.4, at 40 n.29. 
91. Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 788 n.17. 
92. Id. at 792–93 (citations omitted). 
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inserting the sort of economic analysis typically reserved for antitrust 
matters into the scope of the First Amendment. 
E. Commercial Speech Doctrine and the Legal Profession: Bates v. 
State Bar of Arizona 
Justifications for free competition often mirror justifications for free 
speech,93 particularly when the Court focuses upon the public’s interest in 
information.94 Thus, on occasion, litigants (and the courts) have turned to 
the First Amendment when they cannot achieve the desired result for 
maximizing competition via antitrust doctrine. The U.S. Supreme Court 
has used economic competition (and, implicitly, concerns about producer 
capture95) as a basis to strike down numerous regulations banning truthful 
information from reaching the consumer market, starting in the mid-1970s 
with abortion procedures,96 prescription drugs,97 and legal services,98 
                                                     
93. Fred S. McChesney, Commercial Speech in the Professions: The Supreme Court’s 
Unanswered Questions and Questionable Answers, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 48 (1985) (“In deciding 
whether to grant constitutional protection to particular types of professional promotion, the 
Supreme Court has not relied on traditional first amendment analysis. Rather, the Court in evolving 
its commercial speech doctrine has looked to many of the same interests protected by antitrust and 
consumer protection law.”). 
94. For example, in rejecting independence and professionalism as a justification for a ban on 
advertising, the Virginia Pharmacy Court was especially concerned in that “the State’s protectiveness 
of its citizens rests in large measure on the advantages of their being kept in ignorance.” Va. State Bd. 
of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 769 (1976); see also 44 Liquormart v. 
Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503 (1996) (“The First Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical 
of regulations that seek to keep people in the dark for what the government perceives to be their own 
good.”); Martin H. Redish & Abby Marie Mollen, Understanding Post’s and Meiklejohn’s Mistakes: 
The Central Role of Adversary Democracy in the Theory of Free Expression, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 
1303, 1337 (2009) (noting that keeping citizens in ignorance “is as threatening to core democratic 
values as the suppression of any speaker”). 
95. See, e.g., Wiley, Capture Theory, supra note 38, at 756–57 (noting that in Central Hudson Gas 
& Electrical Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557 (1980), the “electric utilities that 
successfully challenged this anticompetitive state restraint could have argued plausibly that it was the 
product of producer capture, but the decision’s first amendment framework caused the Court to review 
the advertising limitation without considering capture or any other antitrust state action issue”). 
96.  Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 829 (1975).  
97. Va. State Bd. of Pharm., 425 U.S. at 764–65. 
98. See Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466, 472 (1988) (holding that categorical ban on direct-
mail solicitation targeting potential clients with specific legal claims violates First Amendment); 
Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977) (holding that categorical ban on lawyer 
advertising violates the First Amendment). 
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followed more recently by an array of other kinds of information ranging 
from utility promotions,99 to commercial handbills,100 to liquor prices.101 
As one scholar explained in writing about commercial speech and 
deceptive advertising, the Court’s initial motivation for “extending first 
amendment protection to some forms of advertising occasionally implied 
that the risk of successful persuasion—even if that persuasion might be 
irrational, or might have socially harmful consequences—could not be a 
constitutional basis for restricting advertising.”102 In later cases, 
“[h]owever, the Court subsequently (without discussing its earlier 
statements) adopted what is apparently a more flexible standard, stating 
that even nondeceptive advertising could be prohibited whenever the 
prohibition would serve a ‘substantial’ state interest, as long as the 
prohibition was no broader than necessary to serve that interest.”103 This 
expansion of the commercial speech doctrine to a “more flexible 
standard” coincides with the Court’s use of the First Amendment to 
review the competitive impact of professional conduct regulations which 
otherwise would be unreachable under the state action doctrine. 
Lawyers and the clients who need them rely heavily upon the speech 
of lawyers—courtroom advocacy, written briefs and opinions, intimate 
advice, counseling, and more. Lawyers’ speech has been described as “not 
only central to what the legal system is all about, and not only the product 
of the law as we know it, but basically the only thing that lawyers and the 
legal system have.”104 Nearly every rule of professional conduct 
governing the practice of law touches upon what a lawyer may, or may 
not, say. Lawyers cannot reveal client confidences.105 They must be 
circumspect in disclosures to the media during a pending trial.106 Lawyers 
walk a fine line in counseling a client about good faith challenges to 
existing laws.107 For many years lawyers could not advertise, and, in most 
jurisdictions, lawyers remain rather constrained in their ability to advertise 
                                                     
99. See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563. 
100. See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 424–25 (1993). 
101. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503 (1996). 
102. Richard Craswell, Interpreting Deceptive Advertising, 65 B.U. L. REV. 657, 667 n.28 (1985) 
(citing Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 96–97 (1977); Va. State Bd. of 
Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770). 
103. Id. (citing Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 and Bates, 433 U.S. at 384). 
104. Frederick Schauer, The Speech of Law and the Law of Speech, 49 ARK. L. REV. 687, 688 
(1996) (“As lawyers, speech is our stock in trade.”).  
105. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014). 
106. See id. r. 3.6. 
107. See id. r. 1.2. 
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and solicit clients.108 They must heed restrictions on their ability to 
criticize the judiciary.109 Indeed, when attorneys take their oath, they 
sacrifice certain free speech rights enjoyed by the public. 
Despite these numerous limitations on lawyers’ speech, the First 
Amendment has also been used to protect attorney advice and advocacy 
as political speech, particularly when access to legal representation is at 
stake.110 In the context of challenges to restrictions viewed as anti-
competitive, however, the Court has applied the commercial speech rubric 
rather than political speech analysis. 
In Bates v. Arizona State Bar,111 the U.S. Supreme Court struck down 
a universal ban on lawyer advertising and, in so doing, recognized “the 
right of the public as consumers and citizens to know about the activities 
of the legal profession.”112 Notably, the Court relied upon commercial 
speech doctrine, rather than antitrust law, to reach what essentially was a 
conclusion about free competition, not free speech. The Court quickly 
dismissed the antitrust claims based upon the state action doctrine. 
A close review of the majority’s opinion suggests that the result was 
driven largely by competition values rather than free speech interests. 
Two recently licensed attorneys, Bates and O’Steen, published a simple 
newspaper advertisement describing routine legal services at set fees, such 
as uncontested divorces, wills, and name changes.113 The Arizona State 
Bar banned all such advertising on the grounds that this helped maintain 
a professional image for lawyers, and protected the public from 
unnecessary litigation or misleading communications.114 The Court 
                                                     
108. See id. r. 7.1–7.3. 
109. See id. r. 3.5. 
110. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428, 439 (1963) (holding that the First Amendment 
protects the “right of the NAACP and its members and lawyers to associate for the purpose of assisting 
persons who seek legal redress for infringements of their constitutionally guaranteed and other rights” 
and observing that “a State may not, under the guise of prohibiting professional misconduct, ignore 
constitutional rights”); Bhd of R.R. Trainmen v. Va. State Bar, 337 U.S 1, 8 (1964) (extending the 
holding of Button to legal advice and representation beyond the civil rights context); United Mine 
Workers of Am., Dist. 12 v. Ill. State Bar Ass’n, 389 U.S. 217, 221–22 (1967) (holding “that the 
freedom of speech, assembly, and petition guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments 
gives . . . the right to hire attorneys . . . to assist . . . in the assertion of . . . legal rights”); United 
Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576, 585 (1971) (observing that “meaningful access to 
the courts is a fundamental right within the protection of the First Amendment”); Legal Servs. Corp. 
v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 546 (2001); Renee Newman Knake, Attorney Advice and the First 
Amendment, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 639, 642–43 (2011). 
111. 433 U.S. 350 (1977). 
112. Id. at 358 (quoting In re Bates, 555 P.2d 640, 648 (Ariz. 1976) (Holohan, J., dissenting)). 
113. Id. at 353–55. 
114. Id. at 368, 372. 
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rejected the Bar’s professionalism concerns and instead elevated the 
public’s need for information. The Court suggested that the lack of 
advertising “reflect[ed] the profession’s failure to reach out and serve the 
community.”115 The Court described its First Amendment analysis in 
language of competition and economic freedom: 
Advertising is the traditional mechanism in a free-market 
economy for a supplier to inform a potential purchaser of the 
availability and terms of exchange. The disciplinary rule at issue 
likely has served to burden access to legal services, particularly 
for the not-quite-poor and the unknowledgeable. A rule allowing 
restrained advertising would be in accord with the bar’s 
obligation to facilitate the process of intelligent selection of 
lawyers, and to assist in making legal services fully available.116 
Thus the commercial speech analysis in Bates (and its progeny117) turns 
on similar factors as would an antitrust analysis, allowing the Court to 
achieve a pro-competitive result even where the state action doctrine 
otherwise exempts the economic restriction from scrutiny.118 Despite the 
First Amendment’s application in Bates, this constitutional argument has 
had less traction when concerned with economic constraints on who may 
practice law, as opposed to how law may be practiced. For example, lower 
courts have refused to find a First Amendment right to have an unlicensed 
                                                     
115. Id. at 370. 
116. Id. at 376–77 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
117. See In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982) (applying First Amendment commercial speech 
protection to lawyer advertising); Zauderer v. Off. of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S 626, 651–52 
(1985) (holding that disciplinary rules could mandate disclosure regarding payment of costs in 
advertisement, but that First Amendment protected attorney so long as advertisement was truthful and 
nondeceptive); Peel v. Att’y Registration and Disciplinary Comm’n of Ill., 496 U.S. 91, 100 (1990) 
(applying First Amendment commercial speech protection to lawyer advertising). 
118. See, e.g., Timothy J. Muris, California Dental Association v. Federal Trade Commission: The 
Revenge of Footnote 17, 8 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 265, 286–87 (2000) (“The seminal commercial 
speech cases—Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. and 
Bates—turned on an analysis of the impact on consumers of banning advertising, just as would an 
antitrust analysis of an advertising ban. Indeed, commentators noted the identity of antitrust and first 
amendment analysis. Under either antitrust law or the first amendment, a restraint based on protection 
of the economic interests of any group, including professionals, would not stand.”). 
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layperson represent an individual in court119 or a right to have non-lawyers 
practice in partnership with lawyers.120 
The outcome of Bates raises the question of whether the First 
Amendment should be used to reach anticompetitive activity that state 
action immunity would otherwise protect. If the answer is yes, that the 
Court will examine the competitive constraint as it did in Bates, then why 
not simply use antitrust law? One concern might be the sanctioning; 
public officials and regulatory volunteers might be less willing to engage 
in government service if they repeatedly face the threat of treble damages 
and attorney’s fees as antitrust remedies.121 States could, of course, opt to 
indemnify and/or defend against Sherman Act violations, an observation 
made by the Court in North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. 
FTC.122 Another concern is that professions are special, needing 
protection from competition in order to function as society and democracy 
                                                     
119. See Turner v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 407 F. Supp. 451, 478 (N.D. Tex. 1975) (citations omitted) 
(“The Plaintiffs have also attempted to couch their right to have unlicensed laymen represent them in 
Court in terms of the first amendment. Their argument is that the first amendment guarantees the 
freedom of association and right to petition their government for redress of grievances. An alliance 
between a defendant, or plaintiff for that matter, and an unlicensed layman for the purpose of litigation 
in Court is an association which has as its end the redress of grievances. Hence, the argument goes, 
the first amendment guarantees the right of the Plaintiffs to have unlicensed attorneys in 
Court. . . . What this Court is holding is that the Constitution of the United States, in particular the 
First and Sixth Amendments, does not grant to the Plaintiffs the right to have an unlicensed layman 
represent them in Court proceedings.”). 
120. See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 544 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“A State may 
forbid one without a license to practice law as a vocation, but I think it could not stop an unlicensed 
person from making a speech about the rights of man or the rights of labor, or any other kind of right, 
including recommending that his hearers organize to support his views. Likewise, the state may 
prohibit the pursuit of medicine as an occupation without its license, but I do not think it could make 
it a crime publicly or privately to speak urging persons to follow or reject any school of medical 
thought.”); Lawline v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 956 F.2d 1378, 1386 (7th Cir. 1992). 
121.  Indeed, Justice Scalia raised this concern in the context of the legal profession during oral 
argument in North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners. Transcript of Oral Argument at 28–
29, N.C. State. Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 574 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015) (No. 13-504); 
see also Daniel A. Crane, The Paradox of Predatory Pricing, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 5 (2005) 
(citing William J. Baumol & Janusz A. Ordover, Use of Antitrust to Subvert Competition, 28 J.L. & 
ECON. 247 (1985)) (noting the problems associated with treble damages in other antitrust contexts 
such as predatory pricing). See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. 
REV. 1 (1984). 
122. See N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 574 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1115 (2015) 
(citation omitted). 
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require.123 If the answer is no, that in Bates the Court got it wrong124 and 
that the First Amendment should not be used to undo competitive 
restraints where the state action doctrine would prevent the reach of 
federal antitrust law, then much of what has been established as protected 
commercial speech would be threatened. 
F. The Consequences of Substituting Commercial Speech Doctrine for 
Competition Law: Distortion and Arbitrary Review 
The concerns highlighted by capture theory continue to resurface via 
challenges on constitutional and competition grounds,125 and capture 
theory reveals a critical disparity where cases involving the same 
competition concerns that motivated the Bates Court go unaddressed 
because a free speech issue is not involved. A divided opinion from the 
U.S. Supreme Court in Hoover v. Ronwin126 applying the state action 
                                                     
123. See discussion supra section I.C.1. But see Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 598–99 (1984) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“In any event, there is true irony in the Court’s reliance on these concerns. 
In essence, the Court is suggesting that a special protective shield should be provided to lawyers 
because they—unlike bakers, engineers, or members of any other craft—may not have sufficient 
confidence in the ability of our legal system to identify and reject unmeritorious claims to be willing 
to assume the ordinary risks of litigation associated with the performance of civic responsibilities. I 
do not share the Court’s fear that the administration of bar examinations by court-appointed lawyers 
cannot survive the scrutiny associated with rather ordinary litigation that persons in most other walks 
of life are expected to endure. . . . The Court also no doubt believes that lawyers—or at least those 
leaders of the bar who are asked to serve as bar examiners—will always be faithful to their fiduciary 
responsibilities. Though I would agree that the presumption is indeed a strong one, nothing in the 
sweeping language of the Sherman Act justifies carving out rules for lawyers inapplicable to any other 
profession. In Goldfarb we specifically rejected such parochialism. Indeed, the argument that it is 
unwise or unnecessary to require the petitioners to comply with the Sherman Act is simply an attack 
upon the wisdom of the longstanding congressional commitment to the policy of free markets and 
open competition embodied in the antitrust laws.” (citation and internal punctuation omitted)). 
124. See, e.g., Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 778 (1993) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“I continue 
to believe that this Court took a wrong turn with Bates v. State Bar of Arizona . . . and that it has 
compounded this error by finding increasingly unprofessional forms of attorney advertising to be 
protected speech. . . . In my view, the States have the broader authority to prohibit commercial speech 
that, albeit not directly harmful to the listener, is inconsistent with the speaker’s membership in a 
learned profession and therefore damaging to the profession and society at large.”).  
125. See, e.g., Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief at ¶ 35, 
Jacoby & Meyers, LLP v. Presiding Justices of the First, Second, Third and Fourth Dep’ts, App. Div. 
of the Sup. Ct. of N.Y., 118 F. Supp. 3d 554 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 1:11-CV-3387-LAK) (“Jacoby & 
Meyers wishes to expand its operations, hire additional attorneys and staff, acquire new technology, 
and improve its physical offices and infrastructure to increase its ability to serve its existing clients 
and to attract and retain new clients and qualified attorneys. Notably, Jacoby & Meyers’ business 
plans principally concern expansion within communities in which working-class, blue-collar and 
immigrant families reside.”). 
126. 466 U.S. 558 (1984); see also Edlin & Haw, supra note 67, at 1141 (arguing that Hass v. Or. 
State Bar, 883 F.2d 1453 (9th Cir. 1989), was wrongly decided because the court “analogize[d] 
licensing boards to municipalities because boards are ‘public,’ citing open meetings, public-minded 
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doctrine to admission to practice requirements is one example of this 
disparity. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Blackmun and White, offered 
in his dissent a lengthy discussion about the concerns of capture 
associated with regulation that is enacted, enforced, and reviewed by 
members of the regulated profession. 
In Hoover v. Ronwin, Edward Ronwin failed the Arizona bar 
examination and then argued that Arizona Supreme Court’s Committee 
on Examinations and Admissions was “artificially reducing the numbers 
of competing attorneys in the State of Arizona” by setting the grading 
scale in accordance with the number of attorneys that the Committee 
deemed appropriate “rather than with reference to some ‘suitable’ level of 
competence.”127 The majority summarily dismissed his argument, 
explaining as follows: 
Our holding is derived directly from the reasoning of Parker and 
Bates. Those cases unmistakably hold that, where the action 
complained of—here the failure to admit Ronwin to the Bar—
was that of the State itself, the action is exempt from antitrust 
liability regardless of the State’s motives in taking the action.128 
The Court did not conduct a Bates-type analysis because Ronwin did not 
present a First Amendment challenge. 
Justices Stevens, Blackmun, and White, dissenting, questioned the 
majority’s blind deference to the state action doctrine: “When 
[state] . . . authority is delegated to those with a stake in the competitive 
conditions within the market, there is a risk that public power will be 
exercised for private benefit.”129 Recognizing the concern of capture, they 
observed that “[a] potential conflict arises, however, whenever 
government delegates licensing power to private parties whose economic 
                                                     
mandates, and an affiliation with the state. . . [and] fail[ed] to recognize that these features cannot 
meaningfully check self-dealing in the way that elections and public visibility check municipal 
officers from self-dealing at the expense of their constituents” (footnote omitted)). 
127. Hoover, 466 U.S. at 565. 
128. Id. at 579–80. The majority characterized the admission denial as an act of the Arizona 
Supreme Court, rather than a state agency. See id. at 588 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The majority’s 
conclusion that the challenged action was that of the Arizona Supreme Court is, however, plainly 
wrong. Respondent alleged that the decision to place an artificial limit on the number of lawyers was 
made by petitioners—not by the State Supreme Court.”). The dissent found significant the fact that 
the admission decision was made by a body with authority delegated by the court. See id. at 590 (“The 
fact that petitioners are part of a state agency under the direction of the sovereign is insufficient to 
cloak them in the sovereign’s immunity; that much was also decided in Goldfarb.”). Capture theory 
would question the anticompetitive effect of the decision whether by the court or a delegated 
authority. 
129. Id. at 585. 
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interests may be served by limiting the number of competitors who may 
engage in a particular trade.”130 
The Court’s expansion of the First Amendment to cover commercial 
speech over the years has resulted in what scholars call “an eclectic 
approach,” with a “diversity of speech” warranting constitutional status 
leading to a complexity that “[j]udges and commentators have been 
understandably reluctant to admit.”131 Not only is the Court’s use of free 
speech principles to reach free competition complex, it is controversial 
and arguably unfounded. Other commentators observe that while, 
“disallowing state interference with commercial advertising serves other 
values that merit careful legislative consideration—aggregate economic 
efficiency and consumer opportunity to maximize utility in a free 
market—these values are not appropriate for judicial vindication under 
the first amendment.”132 
Thus, rather than manipulate the First Amendment, courts might return 
to antitrust law—the body of law designed to further consumer interests 
in a free market and revisit the theoretical underpinnings supporting the 
state action exemption. Capture theory “offers a means for the Court to 
achieve the results of the commercial speech cases without embedding 
those results within the antimajoritarianism of the first amendment.”133 As 
such, “those who criticize recent commercial speech cases for employing 
constitutional efficiency analysis should welcome capture preemption 
under the Sherman Act.”134 
Relying on the First Amendment to assess economic constraints creates 
a haphazard, arbitrary system of judicial review. While a number of 
scholars propose antitrust solutions to address the concerns associated 
                                                     
130. Id. at 584. 
131. Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from a General 
Theory of the First Amendment, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1212, 1282 (1984) (observing that the “exploration 
of the relationship of the first amendment to economic regulation yields a valuable perspective on 
first amendment law”); id. at 1251 (concluding that the Supreme Court applies a “general balancing 
methodology or an eclectic approach” to the First Amendment). 
132. Thomas H. Jackson & John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process 
and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (1979) (“In our view, the first amendment guarantee 
of freedom of speech and press protects only certain identifiable values. Chief among them is self-
government. Additionally, the first amendment may protect the opportunity for individual self-
fulfillment through free expression. Neither value is implicated by governmental regulation of 
commercial speech. Thus the justifications supporting judicial abrogation of political choice to uphold 
the guarantees of the first amendment do not extend to commercial speech.”).  
133. Wiley, Capture Theory, supra note 38, at 779. 
134. Id. at 779 n.307 (claiming that “the Sherman Act is a preferable substitute for the first 
amendment if one believes that commercial speech cases place efficiency reasoning in an illegitimate 
constitutional context”). 
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with regulatory capture for the professions generally, but none recognizes 
the special situation of lawyer regulation.135 Specific to the legal 
profession’s inherent regulatory bias—but outside of the ambit of antitrust 
law—recommendations have been made to place regulatory authority in 
the legislature rather the courts,136 and to increase education of the 
judiciary and the profession about the implications of regulatory 
capture.137 These recommendations, however, have proven unlikely to 
result in any meaningful change. 
A better solution is to calibrate antitrust immunity for state action 
according to the level of disinterest of the state actor. Part II explains the 
contours of the state action doctrine and lays the groundwork for applying 
                                                     
135. One scholar would remove from state action protection any regulations enacted by regulatory 
bodies comprised of members who have financial interests at stake in the economic constraint at issue. 
See Einer Richard Elhauge, The Scope of Antitrust Process, 104 HARV. L. REV. 667, 672 (1991) 
(“[A]ntitrust stands for the . . . limited proposition that those who stand to profit financially from 
restraints of trade cannot be trusted to determine which restraints are in the public interest and which 
are not.”). Others “would look to the actual accountability of the [regulatory body] to determine when 
there is an appreciable risk that the challenged conduct may be the product of parties pursuing their 
own interests rather than state policy” and “would find that such risk is present whenever the entity 
consists in whole or in part of market participants and certainly where the entity is dominated by 
market participants.” Edlin & Haw, supra note 67, at 1142 (citations and internal punctuation omitted) 
(building upon the FTC’s argument in North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners). In other 
words, they would apply both Midcal prongs to “all practitioner-dominated boards . . . regardless of 
the appointment process.” Id. at 1144. They recognize the significant consequences of this position, 
however: “Most licensing boards would fail the supervision prong if subjected to it; requiring state 
supervision for licensing boards that claim state action immunity creates the potential for sweeping 
changes to regulations affecting over a third of the nation’s workforce. Id. Another proposal would 
emphasize “permissive certification and mandatory registration.” Gellhorn, supra note 54, at 26 
(“Engaging in the occupation without a license, or obtaining it by misrepresentation, would be made 
a serious offense, in order to stimulate prompt and accurate registration.”); see also Page, supra note 
21, at 660 (advocating a “clear-statement approach” to resolve “the problem of capture”). Of course, 
it would also be possible to simply strip the professions of the common-law Parker exemption 
entirely, though, as a practical matter, this is unlikely to occur given the degree of entrenchment the 
state action doctrine currently enjoys. 
136. See generally BENJAMIN H. BARTON, THE LAWYER-JUDGE BIAS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL 
SYSTEM (2011). This is similar to Gellhorn’s proposal for a regulatory body “not linked with an 
occupational group . . . created to receive complaints against licensees, investigate them and, if 
objectionable conduct is found, initiate proceedings looking toward revocation, suspension, or other 
appropriate discipline by a court or a special tribunal.” Gellhorn, supra note 54, at 26–27 (“A plan of 
this nature would, I believe, end the present abuse of licensure that services selfish interests by 
constricting occupational freedom.”). 
137. See, e.g., Lawrence W. Kessler, The Unchanging Face of Legal Malpractice: How the 
“Captured” Regulators of the Bar Protect Attorneys, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 457, 499 (2002) (observing 
that the legal “profession has been willfully blind to the danger of over identification with the business 
of lawyering. The institutions have been captured, but they remain unaware of their lack of neutrality. 
The solution to capture is education. Capture may never be eliminated; however, a judiciary that is 
aware of its biases can control them”). 
10 - Knake.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/10/2018  5:49 PM 
2018] THE LEGAL MONOPOLY 1321 
 
a limited antitrust review to professional conduct rules created by lawyer-
judges for the legal profession. 
II. STATE ACTION AND ANTITRUST IMMUNITY 
Federal antitrust laws have been called “the Magna Carta of free 
enterprise” and described “as important to the preservation of economic 
freedom and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the 
protection of our fundamental personal freedoms.”138 Their origin dates 
back to 1890,139 when Congress passed the Sherman Act through the 
purview of the Commerce Clause to prevent certain business 
relationships, including cartels and monopolies, from seizing control of 
too much of the economy.140 The Sherman Act is meant to be: 
[A] comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at 
preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade. It 
rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of 
competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic 
resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and greatest 
material progress, while at the same time providing an 
environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic 
political and social institutions.141 
The law provides for criminal sanctions and treble damages as well as 
attorney fees for a successful challenge, which may be brought by the U.S. 
Department of Justice, the FTC, or private parties.142 
Two different standards govern potential antitrust violations. Some 
activities like price-fixing or group boycotts are deemed illegal per se; 
other endeavors, such as monopolistic behavior, are scrutinized under the 
rule-of-reason, i.e., whether their purpose, operation, and effect are an 
unreasonable restraint on trade. To determine whether federal antitrust 
law will preempt a state law constraining competition, courts first ask 
                                                     
138. Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 111 (1980) (quoting 
United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972)). 
139. See Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, §§ 1–7, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012)). In June of 1890, the United States Congress passed the Sherman Antitrust 
Act. Id. Senator John Sherman (R-OH) authored the Act, which passed the Senate 51-1, 21 CONG. 
REC. 3153 (1890), and the House of Representatives 242-0, 21 CONG. REC. 6314 (1890).  
140. 21 CONG. REC. 2457 (1890) (statement of Sen. John Sherman). Section I of the Sherman Act 
prohibits contracts or conspiracies in restraint of trade. 15 U.S.C. § 1. Section II prevents monopolies 
or attempts to monopolize. Id. § 2. 
141. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958). 
142. See Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890). The Clayton Act, enacted in 1914, 
extended the right to sue under the antitrust laws to the Federal Trade Commission. Clayton Act, Pub. 
L. No. 63-212, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27).  
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whether the state law “mandates or authorizes conduct that necessarily 
constitutes a violation of the antitrust laws in all cases, or . . . places 
irresistible pressure on a private party to violate the antitrust laws in order 
to comply with the statute.”143 If so, the court will then determine whether 
the state law nonetheless is protected from federal preemption.144 
A. Anticompetitive State Regulation Typically is Exempt from Federal 
Antitrust Review 
The command of federal antitrust law does not apply to state sovereigns 
directly engaged in regulatory action because of the judge-made state 
action doctrine,145 first articulated by the Supreme Court in Parker v. 
Brown. “The doctrine rests on the notion that, although Congress might 
have the power to displace certain forms of state regulation, it did not wish 
to do so,”146 and is likely grounded in federalism and state sovereignty 
concerns although the legislative history is silent.147 Indeed, the legislative 
history “contains no reference to the applicability of the act to those areas 
likely to be exempt . . . such as law, medicine, or other ‘learned 
professions.’”148 To be sure, state governments must have freedom to 
legislate in ways where wealth is distributed by regulatory structures 
rather than free competition. Taken to the extreme, were the Sherman Act 
applied broadly, states would largely lose much of their authority.149 
The state action doctrine’s application has inspired a well-developed 
(albeit confusing150) body of literature, yet no final consensus has emerged 
as to the rationale for exempting professional associations from antitrust 
law or to the methodology for applying any such exemption. This is 
                                                     
143. Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 661 (1982).  
144. Id. 
145. See SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, AM. BAR ASS’N, STATE ACTION PRACTICE MANUAL 1 
(2000). 
146. 1 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF 
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 215a, at 339 (3d ed. 2006).  
147. See Spitzer, supra note 47, at 1293, 1295 (“The legislative history of the Sherman Act provides 
no guidance for creating a state action doctrine.”) 
148. Note, The Applicability of the Sherman Act to Legal Practice and Other “Non-Commercial” 
Activities, 82 YALE L.J. 313, 321 (1972). 
149. See David McGowan & Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust Immunity: State Action and Federalism, 
Petitioning, and the First Amendment, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 293, 356–57 (1994) (“If the 
Sherman Act, with its national mandate for competitive markets, were applied to all state regulations 
it would pose a serious threat to the states’ very existence as meaningful government entities.”). 
150. See, e.g., Elhauge, supra note 135, at 674 (“Although the series of cases establishing 
this . . . multi-tier immunity has settled some of the many doctrinal issues raised by state action 
immunity, the doctrine has continued to spawn more confusion and litigation than certainty.”). 
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especially true for the legal profession which enjoys a unique level of self-
regulation. While a handful of commentators have addressed the antitrust 
implications of occupational licensing and industry self-regulation in a 
variety of areas,151 none has fully explored the concerns about competition 
in the arena of lawyer regulation.152 This lack of attention to the legal 
profession’s exceptional regulatory structure makes it a particularly good 
case study for evaluating when, if ever, antitrust immunity ought to be 
limited where the sovereign itself holds membership in the regulated 
group. 
This is not to say that states should be allowed to rubberstamp 
privately-driven economic constraints absent some sort of governmental 
justification. As commentators have noted, “[t]his is certainly not what 
the Court (or anyone else for that matter) has in mind when it speaks of 
the states as sovereign regulators, and allowing liability for such open 
defiance does not threaten the proper role of states in the federal 
system.”153 On one hand, the Court has said that “[t]he reason that state 
action is immune from Sherman Act liability is not that the State has 
chosen to act in an anticompetitive fashion, but that the State itself has 
chosen to act.”154 In other words, the state action exemption does not apply 
“only if the sovereign acted wisely after full disclosure from its 
subordinate officers. The only requirement is that the action be that of the 
‘state acting as a sovereign.’”155 On the other hand, the Court also has said: 
The national policy in favor of competition cannot be thwarted by 
casting such a gauzy cloak of state involvement over what is 
essentially a private price-fixing arrangement. As Parker teaches, 
‘a state does not give immunity to those who violate the Sherman 
Act by authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that their 
action is lawful . . . .’156 
In theory, then, the point of removing so-called “state action” from the 
ambit of antitrust regulation is to respect governmental economic 
decisions where limits on competition are required to achieve some other 
                                                     
151. See, e.g., Gellhorn, supra note 54, at 11; Edlin & Haw, supra note 67, at 1154–56; Elhauge, 
supra note 135, at 725. 
152. Their work, discussed below in Part III, is helpful background for the inquiry here, though 
their conclusions fail to fully embrace the exceptional situation faced by the legal profession, where 
a sovereign, i.e., lawyer-judges acting as legislators, craft the regulations regarding who may enter 
profession and how the profession may be practiced. 
153. See McGowan & Lemley, supra note 149, at 357. 
154. Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 574 (1984).  
155. Id. 
156. Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 106 (1980) (citing 
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943)). 
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public good (though again, under modern doctrine, a state need not 
demonstrate this to enjoy immunity—that the state acts is thought to be 
sufficient, without examination into motive157). 
What constitutes state action for purposes of antitrust exemption, 
however, is not entirely clear, unless the legislature, executive, or 
judiciary (acting legislatively) has explicitly enacted the regulation.158 
When the state delegates its regulatory authority to an agency or 
association, courts struggle to apply the exemption, especially where the 
body is made up of private participants in the regulated group.159 For 
decades it was widely assumed that federal antitrust law did not even 
apply to state regulation of the learned professions like physicians and 
lawyers.160 Not until the 1970s did this view change, when the Court held 
that a minimum fee schedule promulgated by a county bar association 
violated the Act, as discussed above in section I.D.161 
B. Private Interests May Also Be Exempt, If Directed by the State 
California Retail Liquor Dealers Association v. Midcal Aluminum, 
Inc.162 supplies the test that courts currently apply when private actors 
engage in anti-competitive behavior at the direction of the state: they will 
be exempt if the challenged behavior is “clearly articulated and 
affirmatively expressed as state policy” and the policy is “actively 
                                                     
157. See WILLIAM C. HOLMES & MELISSA H. MANGIARACINA, ANTITRUST LAW HANDBOOK 810 
(2013-2014 ed. 2013) (“[A]ttempts were made to carve out special immunity exceptions where the 
state or local government officials approving the conduct allegedly acted in ‘bad faith’ or for ‘corrupt 
motives’ or where the officials ‘conspired’ to serve the interests of private parties rather than the 
public interest. These attempts were soundly rejected by the Supreme Court in City of Columbia v. 
Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc.”). 
158. See, e.g., Hoover, 466 U.S. at 569 (“When the conduct is that of the sovereign itself, on the 
other hand, the danger of unauthorized restraint of trade does not arise. Where the conduct at issue is 
in fact that of the state legislature or supreme court, we need not address the issues of ‘clear 
articulation’ and ‘active supervision.’”); Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc. v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 107 
F.3d 1026, 1036 (3d Cir. 1997) (stating where “the states are sovereign in imposing the [challenged 
economic constraint], the clear articulation and active supervision requirements . . . are 
inapplicable”). 
159. See John Cirace, An Economic Analysis of the “State-Municipal Action” Antitrust Cases, 61 
TEX. L. REV. 481, 484 (1982) (“[N]either the courts nor myriad commentators have been able to 
dispel the confusion and conflict between federal antitrust law and the several rationales for allowing 
states and their subdivisions to displace competition.”). 
160. See WOLFRAM, supra note 17, at 38 (“For almost a century after the federal antitrust laws were 
first enacted, it was widely assumed that lawyers were exempt from their reach . . . . Anyone 
adventuresome enough to speculate about the matter would probably have been unable to convince 
many lawyers that the Supreme Court would apply the antitrust laws to them.”). 
161. See Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791–92 (1975). 
162. 445 U.S. 97 (1980). 
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supervised” by the state.163 The approaches historically adopted by 
various jurisdictions for applying the Midcal test fall loosely into three 
categories: (1) the Second, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits look to a “cursory 
approach” essentially eliminating the active supervision prong of 
Midcal;164 (2) the First, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits use an 
“intermediate approach;”165 and (3) the Fourth Circuit follows the FTC’s 
view in utilizing a “categorical approach,” applying both prongs of Midcal 
vigorously.166 Private parties are exempt from antitrust liability when they 
endeavor to influence the adoption or enforcement of anticompetitive 
laws, a protection known as the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.167 
                                                     
163. Id. at 105. 
164. See Earles v. State Bd. of Certified Pub. Accountants of La., 139 F.3d 1033 (5th Cir. 1998) 
(Louisiana’s state board of Certified Public Accountants (CPAs) prohibited registered CPAs from 
“engaging in the practice of . . . ‘incompatible professions’” like selling securities and other actions. 
Id. at 1034. The Court held that “[s]o long as the Board is acting within its authority and pursuant to 
a clearly established state policy, there is no need for active supervision of the exercise of properly 
delegated authority.” Id. at 1041. In order for the CPA Board to take advantage of state action 
protection, the defendants had to “simply demonstrate that they acted ‘pursuant to state policy to 
displace competition with regulation or monopoly public service’ that was ‘clearly articulated and 
affirmatively expressed.’” Id. at 1042.); Porter Testing Lab. v. Bd. of Regents for Okla. Agric. & 
Mech. Colls., 993 F.2d 768 (10th Cir. 1993); Cine 42nd St. Theatre Corp. v. Nederlander Org., Inc., 
790 F.2d 1032, 1047 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that the development corporation was presumed to be 
public-interested because it was “by statute a political subdivision of the state”).  
165. See Bankers Ins. Co. v. Fla. Residential Prop. & Cas. Joint Underwriting Ass’n, 137 F.3d 1293 
(11th Cir. 1998); Hass v. Or. State Bar, 883 F.2d 1453 (9th Cir. 1989); Fuchs v. Rural Elec. 
Convenience Coop., Inc., 858 F.2d 1210, 1217–18 (7th Cir. 1988) (“We hold that when an entity 
charged with an antitrust violation is neither a municipality nor a state agency but does not have the 
attributes of a purely private actor, it may be held immune as a state actor without the active scrutiny 
of market conditions which is a necessary prerequisite for holding a private entity immune.”); FTC v. 
Monahan, 832 F.2d 688 (1st Cir. 1987); Interface Group, Inc. v. Mass. Port Auth., 816 F.2d 9 (1st 
Cir. 1987). 
166. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 717 F.3d 359, 360 (4th Cir. 2013). 
167. United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965) (“Joint efforts to influence 
public officials do not violate the antitrust laws even though intended to eliminate competition.”); 
Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972) (“[T]he right to petition 
extends to all departments of the Government. The right of access to the courts is indeed but one 
aspect of the right of petition.”); see E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 
U.S. 127, 135 (1961) (“[N]o violation of the [Sherman] Act can be predicated upon mere attempts to 
influence the passage or enforcement of laws.”). The rationale for this immunity is based upon the 
First Amendment’s protection of political speech. See Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, 
Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 499 (1988) (scope of the protection depends on the “source, context, and nature 
of the competitive restraint at issue”); McGowan & Lemley, supra note 149, at 297 (“[A]t least with 
respect to requests directed at state legislators or those vested with state authority, the antitrust 
immunity doctrines are ‘complementary expressions of the principle that the antitrust laws regulate 
business, not politics; Parker protects the States’ acts of governing, and Noerr the citizens’ 
participation in government.’” (quoting City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 
365, 383 (1991))). 
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The U.S. Supreme Court most recently applied Midcal to restraints on 
competition by state-created professional regulatory bodies in a challenge 
by the FTC against the North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners’s 
practice of issuing cease-and-desist letters to non-dentists performing 
teeth-whitening services.168 The FTC determined that the Board of Dental 
Examiners violated antitrust law in issuing the letters, finding that the 
Board acted as a group of private dentists rather than as a state actor, even 
though it was an arm of the state.169 The Fourth Circuit agreed, applying 
the full Midcal test, noting that “state agencies ‘in which a decisive 
coalition (usually a majority) is made up of participants in the regulated 
market,’ who are chosen by and accountable to their fellow market 
participants, are private actors and must meet both Midcal prongs.”170 The 
court found that the arrangement had no “active supervision” because the 
Board consisted of dentists, a dental hygienist, and a member elected by 
the state dental board.171 
In a six-three decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth 
Circuit.172 The majority assumed that the Board was a state agency and 
that its actions were taken pursuant to a clearly articulated and 
affirmatively expressed policy.173 The decisive factor under Parker for 
state action immunity, however, was whether the sovereign is acting to 
implement its policies rather than being controlled by active market 
participants.174 Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, explained, “the 
need for supervision turns not on the formal designation given by States 
to regulators but on the risk that active market participants will pursue 
private interests in restraining trade.”175 In other words, the Court found 
that the Board effectively operated as a private body because a “majority 
of the board’s members are engaged in the active practice of the 
profession it regulates.”176 
Significantly, the Court declined to consider whether a similar 
limitation on antitrust immunity is warranted when the sovereign itself is 
a member of the profession it regulates. It did, however, indicate that 
                                                     
168. See N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 574 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015). 
169. See N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 717 F.3d at 368. 
170. Id. (quoting PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 1A ANTITRUST LAW: AN 
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 227b, at 501 (3d ed. 2009)). 
171. Id. 
172. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 135 S. Ct. at 1120. 
173. Id. at 1110, 1121. 
174. Id. at 1104. 
175. Id. at 1114. 
176. Id. at 1107. 
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promulgation of rules alone is not sufficient to constitute supervision. To 
be “actively supervised,” a politically accountable supervisor “must 
review the substance of the anticompetitive decision, not merely the 
procedures followed to product it,” “have the power to veto or modify 
particular decisions to ensure they accord with state policy,” and “may not 
itself be an active market participant.”177 Moreover, in addition to these 
“constant requirements,” “the adequacy of supervision otherwise will 
depend on all the circumstances of a case.”178 
Relatedly, the opinion in North Carolina Dental Board leaves open 
several questions relevant to this potential extension of the Court’s 
holding. First, what constitutes an “active market participant” in the 
regulated profession or “engaged in the active practice” of it?179 Does this 
include retired members of the profession, or individuals trained in the 
profession who have moved on to other careers? Second, how do we 
define the relevant market? Third, how should we address intrinsic 
concerns beyond economic regulation, such as “procedural due process, 
official misconduct, and conflict of interest”?180 
Ultimately, we do not yet know how the Court views regulation of 
competition when the sovereign itself, as members of the regulated 
profession, engages in the adoption, enforcement, and review of 
anticompetitive state action. This is true whether the relevant market and 
the meaning of active practice are defined narrowly or broadly.181 For 
example, some might say that judges are not engaged in the “active 
practice”182 of law; yet their membership in the legal profession and their 
essential role in the practice of law raise the same sorts of concerns 
underlying the majority opinion in North Carolina Dental Board. 
Moreover, many judges, especially at the state level, will return to private 
practice after a period of judicial service. Questions like these are likely 
                                                     
177. Id. at 1116–17. 
178. Id. 
179. Id. at 1108, 1110. 
180. Cirace, supra note 159, at 485 (“The use of a test with substantive elements in the narrow state 
action area does not necessarily indicate the appropriateness of a substantive test for economic 
regulation broad in impact or not displacing competition. State action cases, however, are not 
concerned exclusively with substantive issues. Questions of procedural due process, official 
misconduct, and conflict of interest are also inherent in these cases.” (citations omitted)). 
181. The U.S. Department of Justice takes a fairly broad reading of this issue. See Statement of 
Interest on Behalf of the United States of America at 11 n.4, TIKD Servs. LLC v. Fla. Bar, No. 1:17-
cv-24103 (S.D. Fl. Mar. 12, 2018), 2018 WL 3387406 (“Under Dental Examiners, state agency 
officials need only practice in the ‘occupation’ regulated by the agency in order to be considered 
active market participants. State officials need not be direct competitors of the plaintiff.”). 
182. See N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 135 S. Ct. at 1107. 
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to come up again given the uncertainty left by the Court’s holding in North 
Carolina Dental Board, as noted by Justice Roberts in his dissent.183 
While some state bar associations proactively endeavored to reduce legal 
exposure by altering their practices, most did not.184 
C. Should the State Action Exemption Apply to Anticompetitive 
Restrictions Enacted by Members of the Regulated Group? 
The analysis undertaken here applies whether the anticompetitive 
regulatory actions are made by a body comprised of the regulated group’s 
membership or directly by the sovereign itself. Though immunity for the 
state acting as a sovereign is, admittedly, a relatively well-settled principle 
in antitrust doctrine, I nevertheless question that assumption for the 
purposes of this Article. The sovereign ought not be wholly exempt from 
                                                     
183. See id. at 1123 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (listing questions left by the majority opinion). Indeed, 
in the months following the Court’s decision, two lawsuits soon followed. In June 2015, LegalZoom, 
an online provider of legal forms and lawyer referrals, sued the North Carolina State Bar for violating 
federal antitrust conspiracy laws, seeking an order requiring the State Bar to register LegalZoom’s 
prepaid legal services plans so that they may be sold in North Carolina. See Complaint for Declaratory 
and Injunctive Relief at 21–22, LegalZoom.com, Inc. v. N.C. State Bar, No. 11 CVS 15111 (N.C. 
Super. Ct. Sept. 30, 2011), 2011 WL 8424700. This case ultimately settled, but the questions it raised 
still remain. LegalZoom.com, Inc. v. N. C. State Bar, No. 11 CVS 15111, 2015 WL 6441853 (N.C 
Super. Ct. Oct. 22, 2015). The following month Express Lien, an online mechanics lien and 
construction payment platform, sued the Ohio State Bar Association alleging that the Bar violated 
antitrust law in “illegally and unreasonably restricting trade by accusing the [p]laintiff of the 
unauthorized practice of law.” Complaint at 4, Express Lien, Inc. v. Cleveland Metro. Bar Ass’n, No. 
2:15-cv-02519 (E.D. La. July 9, 2015), 2015 WL 4295032. This case also settled, and Express Lien 
continues to operate in Ohio. See Order Dismissing Case, Express Lien Inc. v. Cleveland Metro. Bar 
Ass’n, No. 2:15-cv-02519 (E.D. La. Apr. 5, 2016), 2015 WL 4295032. Nevertheless, inevitably, 
courts will continue to be confronted with issues surrounding whether antitrust immunity should be 
limited when members of the regulated group promulgate competitive constraints. For example, as 
this Article goes to print, TIKD Services, LLC, a service matching individuals with parking tickets to 
lawyers via a mobile app, is pursuing an $11.4 million antitrust suit against the Florida State Bar. 
Carolina Bolado, DOJ Rebuts Fla. Bar’s Bid to Escape TIKD’s Antitrust Suit, LAW360 (Mar. 12, 
2018, 5:25 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1021164/doj-rebuts-fla-bar-s-bid-to-escape-tikd-
s-antitrust-suit (last visited Sept. 1, 2018). On March 12, 2018, the U.S. Department of Justice filed a 
Statement of Interest in support of TIKD. Statement of Interest on Behalf of the United States of 
America, supra note 181. 
184. For example, the Washington State Bar Association suspended the issuance of potentially anti-
competitive advisory opinions. See Samson Habte, Washington Bar Suspends Ethics Opinions, Cites 
Antitrust Fears, BLOOMBERG BNA (Dec. 17, 2015), https://www.bna.com/washington-bar-suspends-
n57982065288/ [https://perma.cc/UT96-WPUS]. Similarly, though ultimately unsuccessful, the 
North Carolina State Bar proposed legislation that would have required the state attorney general to 
actively supervise any unauthorized practice of law actions that appeared to be anticompetitive. See 
S.B. 353, 2015 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2015); Ronald L. Gibson, An Update on Legislation 
and Litigation, N.C. STATE BAR J., Summer 2015, at 5, 8. 
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federal competition law when the sovereign is regulating itself, given the 
inherent bias in this sort of arrangement.185 
Consider the regulatory structure of the legal profession. When the 
judiciary regulates its own profession in anticompetitive ways, is it 
operating more like a governmental unit such as “a municipality, [where] 
there is little or no danger that it is involved in a private price-fixing 
arrangement”186 or more like a “private party . . . [where] there is a real 
danger that [it] is acting to further [its] own interests, rather than the 
governmental interests of the State”?187 Should the public be inherently 
suspicious of rules enacted by government officials who are members of 
the regulated profession, or should we give deference to them as insider 
experts in their field? Does it matter whether members of the protected 
group receive a financial benefit or other reward? If the officials are 
accountable to the public through elections, does this ameliorate concerns 
about self-interest? Are these the sorts of competition constraints 
deserving immunity from antitrust scrutiny under the state action 
doctrine? Or are these instances where the underlying principles 
supporting state action immunity—for example the disinterested public 
actor—are not present and thus should render the regulation subject to 
antitrust review? Part III responds to these questions. 
Part III of this Article offers a new recommendation—a specialized 
antitrust review for regulations governing the practice of law to the extent 
they are controlled by lawyers or lawyer-judges, a conclusion that may 
follow for other professions as well.  
III. APPLYING ANTITRUST LAW TO LAWYER-JUDGE 
REGULATION OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 
Antitrust law is a desirable mechanism for review of professional 
regulations promulgated by state officials who belong to the regulated 
profession for at least two reasons. First, courts are vulnerable to the 
problems associated with capture as members of the profession they 
regulate. Second, the First Amendment is an imprecise tool for 
appropriately evaluating restrictions on competition. Relatedly, the free 
speech doctrine arguably has been over-extended to address the 
economics of competition causing unintended distortion in other areas of 
                                                     
185. See generally BARTON, supra note 136; CLIFFORD WINSTON, ROBERT W. CRANDALL & 
VIKRAM MAHESHRI, FIRST THING WE DO, LET’S DEREGULATE ALL THE LAWYERS (2011); Edward 
S. Adams & John H. Matheson, Law Firms on the Big Board?: A Proposal for Nonlawyer Investment 
in Law Firms, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1998). 
186. Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 47 (1985). 
187. Id. 
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First Amendment jurisprudence. How, then, should courts limit antitrust 
immunity in this context? 
A. A Proposal for Specialized Antitrust Review of Competitive 
Constraints Enacted by the Regulated Group 
Limiting antitrust immunity for judicial regulation of the legal 
profession involves a number of considerations. Do we apply federal 
antitrust law’s standard per se and rule-of-reason tests or do we apply a 
modified antitrust review; for example, something similar to the “quick-
look” analysis devised for collegiate athletics?188 The latter option—a 
modified, consumer-based antitrust inquiry—likely works best. In short, 
federal antitrust law should preempt anticompetitive lawyer regulation if 
the rule “hurts consumers by impairing competition without solving some 
serious market problem in a way beneficial”189 to the public or preserving 
an essential element of law practice. 
Thus, a court first would identify whether or not a challenged 
regulation frustrates the competition goals of federal antitrust law.190 
Second, if so, the court would look to see if the sovereign regulator is also 
a member of the targeted profession. Third, assuming this is the case, the 
court next would inquire whether the regulation preserves an essential 
element of professional practice—e.g., the advice-giving and advocacy 
roles of a lawyer, such as the rule governing the duty of confidentiality. 
Fourth, the court, as a last step, would evaluate whether the regulation, 
even if anticompetitive, nevertheless benefits the consumer. If not, the 
regulation ought to be struck down. This consumer-driven focus mirrors 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s articulated reasoning when it turned to the First 
Amendment to strike down the advertising ban in Bates. 
Under a test like this, Hoover v. Ronwin would have come out as Justice 
Stevens advocated in his dissent,191 with Mr. Ronwin receiving his day in 
                                                     
188. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 100–01, 109, 117 (1984) (proposing 
a middle ground approach between per se and the rule-of-reason called the “quick-look” analysis to 
be used when “no elaborate industry analysis is required to demonstrate the anticompetitive character 
of . . . an agreement” and where the restraint typically would be deemed illegal per se but “a certain 
degree of cooperation is necessary”); see also Goldfarb vs. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 788 n.17 
(1975) (observing that the “public service” aspect of a competitive constraint “may require that a 
particular practice, which could properly be viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in another 
context, be treated differently” (quoting Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 
692 (1978))). 
189. Wiley, Capture Theory: Reply to Professors Page and Spitzer, supra note 43, at 1336. 
190. The Bates Court said as much, albeit grounded in the language of free speech. Bates v. State 
Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 363–65 (1977).  
191. Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 587–88, (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (observing that 
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court to prove whether the Arizona Supreme Court and bar authorities had 
acted in the anticompetitive ways he alleged. Artificially capping the 
number of competent lawyers admitted to practice in order to reduce 
competition and maintain artificially high prices would, if proven, harm 
consumers without resolving a market problem to the public’s benefit or 
preserving a distinct aspect of the practice of law. 
By contrast, one might argue that American Bar Association Model 
Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6192 governing confidentiality (which has 
been adopted in most jurisdictions by state judiciaries) suppresses 
competition by constraining the information an attorney may share about 
details related to client matters. Perhaps if attorneys could use information 
about pending cases as a marketing tool, more competition would exist 
among legal service providers.193 But this rule protects a critical element 
of the practice of law—the confidentiality an attorney owes to a client 
during and after the representation and, as such, would not be invalidated 
under the antitrust review proposed here. 
Were courts to adopt the specialized antitrust review proposed here, a 
number of questions remain. For example, who should assess the remedy? 
Is it appropriate for lawyer-judges to supply the antidote to the very 
anticompetitive lawyer regulations they themselves tailor? As a matter of 
due process, perhaps federal jurisdiction should extend to challenges 
involving state lawyer conduct rules to avoid having those who adopt the 
rules determine their legality. What sort of remedy is best suited—the 
Sherman Act’s automatic treble damages or injunctive relief or a 
combination of both? I leave these questions for another day but 
acknowledge that their resolution will be required should federal courts 
begin to apply antitrust law more robustly to professional regulation as 
contemplated here. Section III.B offers some preliminary insights on the 
consumer’s perspective about how best to answer these questions. 
                                                     
while it may “seem highly improbable that members of the profession entrusted by the State Supreme 
Court with a public obligation to administer an examination system that will measure applicants’ 
competence would betray that trust, and secretly subvert that system to serve their private ends[;] 
[n]evertheless, the probability that respondent will not prevail at trial is no justification for dismissing 
the complaint”). 
192. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014). 
193. Such a challenge on antitrust grounds is not entirely unlikely. See, e.g., Hunter v. Va. State 
Bar, 786 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1113 (E.D. Va. 2011) (holding on First Amendment grounds that attorney 
could blog about successful representations including client names notwithstanding Rule 1.6 
confidentiality protections). 
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B. The Consumer Law Market as a Case Study 
Does it matter whether the legal profession suffers from capture in 
regulating itself? In the absence of the regulatory reform advocated for 
here, the question is difficult to answer. Yet the plight for most Americans 
in need of legal services cannot be ignored. How might lawyer-judge-
made professional regulations matter for individual consumers of legal 
services? 
The consumer law market—i.e. those individuals who do not qualify 
for legal aid and are unwilling or unable to pay for an attorney who 
charges three-figures-an-hour for multiple hours194—has long been denied 
affordable, accessible, widely-adopted legal services. According to some 
estimates, this is as much as 80% or more of the American population.195 
Every decade going back at least to University of Chicago Law Professor 
Karl Llewllyn’s call in the 1930s for lawyers to “find[ ] the customer who 
                                                     
194. This definition of the consumer law market is similar to that of “middle-classes” as articulated 
by George Harris and Derek Foran: “those individuals and households who are ineligible for publicly 
supported legal services but have not yet accumulated capital sufficient to sustain a comfortable 
lifestyle without maintaining their current income.” George C. Harris & Derek F. Foran, The Ethics 
of Middle-Class Access to Legal Services and What We Can Learn from the Medical Profession’s 
Shift to a Corporate Paradigm, 70 FORDHAM. L. REV. 775, 789 (2001) (footnotes omitted). This 
encompasses most of the American public.  
195. See generally DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 3 (2004) [hereinafter RHODE, ACCESS 
TO JUSTICE] (“According to most estimates, about four-fifths of the civil legal needs of the poor, and 
two- to three-fifths of the needs of middle-income individuals, remain unmet.”); Catherine R. Albiston 
& Rebecca L. Sandefur, Expanding the Empirical Study of Access to Justice, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 101 
(2013); Gillian K. Hadfield, The Cost of Law: Promoting Access to Justice Through the 
(Un)Corporate Practice of Law, 38 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 43, 43 (2013) [hereinafter Hadfield, The 
Cost of Law] (“The ordinary family obtains no legal help or advice with legal problems, muddling 
alone through the crises of job loss, divorce, bankruptcy, immigration challenges, access to services 
and benefits, injuries, and conflicts with neighbors or schools or health-care providers or local 
officials. We live in a law-thick world that people are left to navigate largely in the dark.”); Rebecca 
L. Sandefur, Money Isn’t Everything: Understanding Moderate Income Households’ Use of Lawyers’ 
Services, in MIDDLE INCOME ACCESS TO JUSTICE (Michael Trebilcock et al. eds., 2012); SANDEFUR, 
ACCESSING JUSTICE, supra note 3; REBECCA L. SANDEFUR & AARON C. SMYTH, AM. BAR FOUND., 
ACCESS ACROSS AMERICA: FIRST REPORT OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE INFRASTRUCTURE MAPPING 
PROJECT (2011), 
http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/uploads/cms/documents/access_across_america_first_report
_of_the_civil_justice_infrastructure_mapping_project.pdf [https://perma.cc/JL6R-BAFY];  
D. MICHAEL DALE, A.L. BURRUS INST. OF PUB. SERV. & RESEARCH, CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW 
AND MODERATE INCOME HOUSEHOLDS IN GEORGIA 27 (2009), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/delivery_legal_services/downloads/ge
orgia_legal_needs_study.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/A76Y-NJGF]; D. MICHAEL DALE, 
LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW INCOME HOUSEHOLDS IN MONTANA 5 (2005); DENISE R. JOHNSON ET AL., 
COMM. ON EQUAL ACCESS TO LEGAL SERVS., REPORT ON INVESTIGATION OF NEED AND 
ASSESSMENT OF RESOURCES 7 (2001). 
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does not know he wants it and mak[e] him want it,”196 members of the 
profession have bemoaned the plight of the average American who likely 
does not even recognize that she has a problem with a legal solution, let 
alone the requisite financial or informational resources to secure legal 
assistance. Yet, no concrete regulatory reform has occurred over the years 
in an effort to improve the competitive conditions for the consumer law 
market. This failure is unlikely to self-correct absent fundamental market 
restructuring. 
Why has the American legal profession continued to ignore the needs 
of the middle-classes over the past century? Several reasons exist. First, 
the middle class lacks the sympathy of the poor.197 Second, those 
attempting to provide low-cost legal services on a mass scale struggle to 
build an economically-sustainable business model.198 Third, legal 
education’s priority has always been preparation for entry into mid- and 
large-sized law practice and, even with the modern emphasis on clinical 
training, largely omits any meaningful training on service to the consumer 
law market. 
The problem is not one of demand—millions need legal help.199 The 
problem is not one of supply—thousands of attorneys lost their jobs or 
struggle to find their first in the twenty-first century’s upside-down legal 
economy.200 The problem rests in asymmetrical information coupled with 
high costs because the existing regulatory structure suppresses 
                                                     
196. K. N. Llewellyn, The Bar’s Troubles, and Poultices—and Cures?, 5 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 104, 115 (1938) (emphasis in original) (“[S]pecialized work, mass-production, cheapened 
production, advertising and selling—finding the customer who does not know he wants it, and making 
him want it: these are the characteristics of the age. Not, yet, of the Bar.” (emphasis in original)); see 
also Elliott E. Cheatham, A Lawyer when Needed: Legal Services for the Middle Classes, 63 COLUM. 
L. REV. 973, 973 (1963) (“The wide gap between the need and its satisfaction by the bar has been 
indicated by numerous studies.”); Gillian K. Hadfield, Higher Demand, Lower Supply? A 
Comparative Assessment of the Legal Resource Landscape for Ordinary Americans, 37 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 129, 133 (2010) (“[T]he bulk of civil legal services, and especially ex ante advisory services, 
are ultimately provided to corporations rather than ordinary folks.”); Barbara A. Stein, Legal Services 
and the Middle Class, 53 N.D. L. REV. 573, 580 (1977) (“[C]onsumer surveys demonstrate that the 
economic suffering of attorneys derives not from a scarcity of need on the part of the public, but from 
insufficient fulfillment of that need.”). 
197. See generally Cheatham, supra note 196. 
198. See RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 195, at 3 (providing a detailed overview of the 
lack of legal services for poor and moderate-income individuals and proposing reforms); Susan Carle, 
Re-Valuing Lawyering for Middle-Income Clients, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 719, 722–23 (2001). 
199. See Renee Newman Knake, Democratizing Legal Education, 45 CONN. L. REV. 1281, 1286 
(2013). 
200. Id. at 1284 (“The pervasive need for legal services is not because lawyers are unavailable; in 
fact, law schools are graduating new attorneys at unprecedented rates, and thousands of licensed, 
experienced attorneys are unemployed/underemployed.” (citations omitted)). 
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competition and maintains artificially high rates. Making information 
about law available through pro bono efforts and law-related education, 
while laudable to be sure, has not been a sufficient solution. One of the 
oft-cited arguments against liberalizing lawyer regulation is the 
speculation that non-lawyer legal services are dangerous to the public, and 
yet non-lawyer services are precisely what consumers demand.201 
Given the legal profession’s historic treatment of the consumer law 
market, one might be skeptical that meaningful legal representation will 
ever be uniformly available to the mass public. Is it possible to 
commoditize the legally-trained mind in a way where uniquely tailored 
legal advice can be delivered through an economically-sustainable model 
at a mass level? On the one hand, perhaps with the advent of modern 
computer and mobile technology coupled with the potential for artificial 
intelligence we now, finally, can harness cost-effective tools to perform 
tasks that previously took a human attorney many hours to complete. On 
the other hand, the profession witnessed similar technological revolutions, 
for example the typewriter at the turn of the century,202 and these 
innovations did little to alleviate the persistent consumer legal need. 
What might a vibrant consumer law market look like? Consider this 
proposal from nearly a century ago: 
A group of capable young lawyers, on a salary and profit-sharing 
basis under mature business and legal direction, could set a 
precedent in specialized, low cost, large scale office organization. 
Coupled with group publicity, such an experiment would be likely 
to open up quickly considerable new business, and a method of 
handling it.203 
A significant barrier to this 1930s proposal for legal services in a mass 
retail setting—considered a radical innovation then and still now—is a 
lack of financial options for lawyers to invest in technology due to 
                                                     
201. See, e.g., Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Law’s Information Revolution, 53 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 1169, 1171 (2011) (“[The] traditional market for legal services is breaking down as lawyers 
lose their monopoly over law-related services and must compete with alternative providers of similar 
services.”). 
202. See, e.g., Catherine J. Lanctot, Attorney-Client Relationships in Cyberspace: The Peril and 
the Promise, 49 DUKE L.J. 147, 163–65 (1999) (noting the refusal of lawyers at prominent law firms 
such as Cravath, Swain & Moore and Sullivan & Cromwell to adopt use of the telephone); Richard 
L. Marcus, The Impact of Computers on the Legal Profession: Evolution or Revolution?, 102 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1827, 1853 (2008); Michael Simkovic, The Economic Value of a Law Degree 36 (Harv. L. 
Sch. Program on the Legal Profession, Paper No. 2013-6, 2013), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2250585 [https://perma.cc/53HA-B6JU] 
(“Predictions of structural change in the legal industry date back at least to the invention of the 
typewriter.” (citations omitted)). 
203. Love et al., supra note 2, at 671.  
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anticompetitive lawyer regulation. Calls for reform to enable Internet and 
technology-driven legal services for the consumer law market extend over 
a decade, yet regulators have voluntarily done little to facilitate 
competition.204 And it appears unlikely that any meaningful change will 
come absent external force.205 
To realize the benefits of modern technology and design for the 
consumer law market, the legal profession must create a space for 
innovation to occur. Innovation requires ideas, competition, and capital,206 
all of which the existing regulatory structure for American law practice 
restricts because of the ban on non-lawyer ownership and investment as 
well as geographic practice restrictions.207 Innovation also requires input 
                                                     
204. See, e.g., Harris & Foran, supra note 194, at 805–06 (“Investments in technology by corporate-
backed legal service providers would also allow for faster, more efficient, and more affordable service 
to those consumers once the connection was made. Routine questions could be answered, and routine 
services provided, largely through software technology, and consumers with more individualized 
needs could be identified through the same technology. The technology is available, the need is 
established, and the middle classes are on-line. What is missing are properly capitalized service 
providers willing to make the necessary investment.”). The ABA has responded to the impact of 
technology merely by incorporating an obligation to “keep abreast of changes in the law and its 
practice, including the benefits and risks associated with relevant technology” into the explanatory 
comments in Model Rule 1.1. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 8 (AM. BAR. ASS’N 
2014). 
205. See Renee Newman Knake, Democratizing the Delivery of Legal Services, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1, 1 (2012) (suggesting that, if given the opportunity, the U.S. Supreme Court could address the issue 
of non-lawyer ownership and investment much in the same way it did with the blanket ban on lawyer 
advertising in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona); Ted Schneyer, “Professionalism” as Pathology: The 
ABA’s Latest Policy Debate on Nonlawyer Ownership of Law Practice Entities, 40 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 75, 137 (2012) (“I was disappointed that the 20/20 Commission decided not to recommend our 
proposal for adoption by the ABA House of Delegates . . . . [N]o relaxation of the ban on nonlawyer 
ownership of law firms by the ABA or state supreme courts seems likely in the short term—unless, 
of course, the ban is struck down in litigation.”). 
206. See ROBERT D. COOTER & HANS-BERND SCHÄFER, SOLOMON’S KNOT: HOW LAW CAN END 
THE POVERTY OF NATIONS 120 (2012) (“To produce innovations, money and ideas must come 
together like the rings in Solomon’s knot.”); MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 132–
33 (1982) (“The impossibility of any individual or small group conceiving of all the possibilities, let 
alone evaluating their merits, is the great argument against central governmental planning and against 
arrangements such as professional monopolies that limit the possibilities of experimentation. On the 
other side, the great argument for the market is its tolerance of diversity; its ability to utilize a wide 
range of special knowledge and capacity. It renders special groups impotent to prevent 
experimentation and permits the customers and not the producers to decide what will serve the 
customers best.”). 
207. Hadfield, Legal Barriers to Innovation, supra note 30, at 1723 (“Innovation is not merely the 
discovery of new ideas; it is the scaling up of those ideas into implementable organizations, systems, 
products, equipment, and processes that generate economic value. Professional regulation of legal 
markets significantly restricts the capacity for scaling up new legal ideas by limiting the potential to 
exploit economies of scale and scope.”); Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 201, at 1218 (“[M]any 
potential legal information innovations that are constrained by licensing laws [which] shows how the 
rise of the legal information market intensifies arguments for reexamining lawyer licensing laws.”). 
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and experimentation beyond the members of the profession itself. 
Collaborative partnerships with non-lawyers are stifled by 
anticompetitive rules prohibiting multi-disciplinary practice. 
To fully (or even partially208) serve the unmet needs of the consumer 
law market, lawyers “should be free to organize firms to pursue business 
opportunities as they see fit and to select a form of governance from a 
menu of legal alternatives.”209 This is a fundamental principle of 
organizational liberty and “[b]y removing prohibitions and allowing 
choice over organizational forms, economic liberty releases the energies 
of entrepreneurs and sends innovation on its creative, unpredictable 
path.”210 Other scholars have documented the economic inefficiencies of 
lawyer regulation and lack of competition.211 Their work provides further 
support for antitrust review of court-made lawyer regulation. 
CONCLUSION 
When members of a profession, acting as the state, regulate their 
profession, the foundational assumptions underlying state action antitrust 
immunity become compromised. That is especially true in the case of 
lawyer-judge regulation. The delegating authority, the 
enactment/enforcement power, and the body reviewing constitutional 
challenges to the regulation are all members of the legal profession, 
whether lawyers or judges. To challenge the regulations, the case must be 
pled to lawyers or lawyer-judges, often the very judicial body responsible 
for enacting the rules in the first place. Even where these officials are 
subject to some measure of public accountability through elections or an 
appointment process, the fact remains that they are members of the very 
profession subject to the regulations they create and administer. 
It is true that the justificatory values of competition within the 
profession may be partially vindicated via the First Amendment. Yet, 
substituting the constitution for antitrust leaves an arbitrary gap in review, 
where anticompetitive regulations not involving speech endure, even if 
harmful to consumers. While the special duties of professionals, such as 
lawyers, necessitate a different sort of test rather than that applied when 
private actors engage in anticompetitive activity, this does not mean the 
                                                     
208. It may be that even with liberalization of the organizational/distribution rules what ails the 
consumer law market will not be fully cured; but there is at least a portion of the latent market that 
will be reached.  
209. COOTER & SCHÄFER, supra note 206, at 136 (emphasis omitted). 
210. Id. 
211. See generally WINSTON, CRANDALL & MAHESHRI, supra note 185; Hadfield, Legal Barriers 
to Innovation, supra note 30; Hadfield, The Cost of Law, supra note 195, at 43; Hazard, Pearce & 
Stempel, supra note 55. 
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professions should escape all review under the cover of state action 
immunity. Rather, this Article calls for limiting antitrust immunity when 
members of the regulated profession, acting as the state, design rules that 
impair competition without curing a market problem to the public’s 
benefit or preserving an essential element of professional practice. Doing 
so promises to democratize access to legal services for the American 
public. 
 
